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FRIENDS WITH BENEFITS?
Laura A. Rosenbury*
Family law has long been intensely interested in certain adult inti-
mate relationships, namely marriage and marriage-like relationships,
and silent about other adult intimate relationships, namely friend-
ship. This Article examines the effects of that focus, illustrating how it
frustrates one of the goals embraced by most family law scholars
over the past forty years: the achievement of gender equality, within
the family and without. Part I examines the current scope of family
law doctrine and scholarship, highlighting the ways in which the
home is still the organizing structure for family. Despite calls for in-
creased legal recognition of diverse families, few scholars have
considered whether family law should recognize care provided out-
side of the home, and no scholar has considered whether family law
should recognize the care provided and received by friends. Part II
turns to friendship, considering the practices of people who self-
identify as friends and the ways that such practices are already influ-
enced by the law's maintenance of a divide between friendship and
family. That divide amounts to state support of the types of domestic
caregiving that traditionally played vital roles in maintaining state-
supported patriarchy and that still largely follow gendered patterns
today. Family law thereby reinforces traditional gender role expecta-
tions rather than alleviating them. Part III then explores how
simultaneous legal recognition offriendship and family could lead to
greater opportunities to structure life free from state-supported gen-
der role expectations. By supporting more pluralistic personal
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relationships and conceptions of care, family law could transform not
just friendship and marriage, but gender itself
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INTRODUCTION
Family law has long ignored friendship. Even recent attempts to expand
traditional notions of the family have failed to consider whether friends
might serve many of the functions that the law reserves for family. This si-
lence may or may not be good for friendship, which is often thought to
thrive outside of the law. But the silence frustrates the accomplishment of
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one of the goals embraced by most family law scholars: the achievement of
full gender equality, within the family and without.
This Article illustrates how family law's failure to recognize friendship
impedes existing attempts to achieve gender equality through the elimina-
tion of state-supported gender role expectations. First, family law's
recognition of marriage and silence with respect to friendship maintains a
divide between marriage and "mere" friendship, implying that nonspousal
friendship differs sufficiently from marriage and marriage-like relationships
to be properly outside the concern of family law. Whether this strict divide
between friendship and family conforms to people's lived experiences is
uncertain, although legal recognition is undoubtedly a salient difference be-
tween friendship and marriage. Common understandings of both marriage
and friendship are thus shaped, at least in part, by family law's focus on
marriage and silence with respect to friendship.
Second, the divide between friendship and marriage is not gender neu-
tral. Rather, it amounts to state support of the types of domestic caregiving
that traditionally played vital roles in maintaining state-supported patriarchy
and that still largely follow gendered patterns today. Family law's focus on
marriage to the exclusion of other forms of friendship can encourage people
to prioritize one comprehensive domestic relationship over other relation-
ships. Indeed, if individuals want the state to recognize their relationships
with other adults, they generally must enter into a marriage or, increasingly,
a relationship that mirrors marriage. That encouragement can in turn per-
petuate gendered patterns of care because extensive amounts of care are
expected of such relationships, and women are still more likely than men to
be the primary providers of that care. Friendship, in contrast, does not con-
sistently demand the same amount of care, in part because friendships are
not presumed to be exclusive or comprehensive and in part because friend-
ships are presumed to embrace norms of equality and autonomy over norms
of domestic dependency.
In developing this argument, this Article analyzes the current scope of
family law, uncovering several assumptions that silently underlie family law
scholarship. Most saliently, the home is still the organizing structure for
family. Although family law scholars have called for increased legal recog-
nition of diverse families, including nonconjugal families, few scholars have
considered whether family law should recognize care provided outside of
the home, and no scholar has considered whether family law should recog-
nize the care provided and received by friends. Instead, family law scholars
assume that if individuals do not have a family based in the home, they are
essentially alone and have no caregiving obligations. In addition, although
family law scholars have focused considerable attention on the law's con-
struction of the family, they have failed to question the construction of
family law, including the effects that law may have on relationships outside
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of the family home. These assumptions intersect to place friendship outside
of family law's domain, limiting family law's ability to consider forms of
care that may lead toward more robust conceptions of gender equality.
This Article then explores what it would mean to change the current
construction of family law by bringing friendship into the law's accounting.
Whether legal recognition of friendship could disrupt the privileging of
comprehensive domestic caregiving relationships depends on one's view of
the interplay between law and society in the construction of family law.
Many legal theorists argue that the law can never produce social change but
rather can only follow and reflect such change. Pursuant to such a view,
family law's focus on domesticity within the home reflects the social prac-
tices of most individuals. This Article takes a different view, highlighting the
ways that the social practices of both friendship and family are already con-
sequences of the law. Changing the law's focus can therefore change
understandings of both family and friendship, potentially leading to greater
opportunities to structure life free from state-supported gender role expecta-
tions.
Part I of the Article briefly reviews family law's commitment to gender
equality, beginning in the 1970s, and various scholars' critiques about the
limits of that commitment given states' resistance to recognizing same-sex
marriage and other nontraditional living arrangements. These critiques have
been confined, however, to the question of whether people in certain sexual
relationships or cohabitation relationships--or both-are deserving of fam-
ily law recognition. None of the critiques explores the consequences of
family law's failure to consider relationships between friends who do not
live together or who do not hold themselves out as sharing a sexual com-
mitment.
Part II turns to friendship, first examining the ways the law already
shapes friendship by defining it against state-recognized familial relation-
ships. It then analyzes the functions often performed by people who self-
identify as friends, specifically friends who do not live together or who do
not define their relationship by reference to a sexual commitment. By com-
paring these functions to the functions generally assumed to be performed
by spouses and other family members, Part II considers and critiques the
values privileged by the law's recognition of family and corresponding si-
lence with respect to friendship.
Part III then examines how legal recognition of friendship could begin to
disrupt gendered patterns of care. Ending the silence with respect to friend-
ship does not mean that family law must rigidly regulate friendship or even
extend friends the same benefits accorded to families. Indeed, such regula-
tion could reinforce, rather than challenge, the privileging of marriage and
other family relationships. Nor is the elimination of marriage required. In-
stead, family law could consider ways that the law might support more, and
[Vol. 106:189
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multiple, forms of personal relationships between adults, thereby acknowl-
edging diverse conceptions of care and reinventing individuals' options with
respect to both marriage and friendship.
I. PAST AND CURRENT CONSTRUCTIONS OF FAMILY LAW
Family law is a state construction, subject to change and reinvention.'
The states determine who may constitute families recognized by the state,
and the states delineate the responsibilities and privileges of those family
members. Indeed, the content of family law has changed dramatically over
time in the United States. Initially called "domestic relations," family law at
the time of the nation's founding encompassed all of a household's internal
relationships, including master-servant, master-slave, husband-wife, and
parent-child.2 The boundaries of family law have changed in multiple ways
since that time,' but spousal and parent-child relationships have consistently
remained within the construction of family law.
The state initially recognized these spousal and parent-child relation-
ships as a means to privatize the dependency of both women and children.
Men, not the state, assumed responsibility for this dependency and generally
received the full range of citizenship rights in return. With the passage of
various family law reforms and, ultimately, the Nineteenth Amendment,
wives were no longer officially dependent on their husbands. However, the
states still recognized families as a means to privatize dependency, particu-
larly the dependency of children on their parents and the financial and
emotional dependencies thought to arise when individuals share a house-
hold.5 Because the law no longer mandated much of that dependency, some
1. Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825, 829 (2004)
("[L]egislatures, courts, and legal scholars have created the family law canon, and the family law
canon has in turn shaped how these legal authorities and scholars think about family law, and how
they teach their students and successors to view the field.").
2. See, e.g., TAPPING REEVE, THE LAW OF BARON AND FEMME, OF PARENT AND CHILD, OF
GUARDIAN AND WARD, OF MASTER AND SERVANT, AND OF THE POWERS OF COURTS OF CHANCERY,
(Lucius E. Chittenden ed., 2d ed., Burlington, Vt., Chauncey Goodrich 1846).
3. Martha Minow, "Forming Underneath Everything That Grows:" Toward a History of
Family Law, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 819, 825 (stating that the routine inclusion of master-servant rela-
tions in early treatises "itself suggests how the conception of family or domestic life has changed
historically").
4. NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 7 (2000) ("A
man's headship of a family, his taking the responsibility for dependent wife and children, qualified
him to be a participating member of a state.").
5. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH 35-37 (2004); see also
Martha Albertson Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths: Independence, Autonomy and Self-
Sufficiency, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 13, 14 (2000) ("The assumed family is a specific
ideological construct with a particular population and a gendered form that allows us to privatize
individual dependency and pretend that it is not a public problem.").
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family law scholars began to describe it as domesticity or care.6 Justifica-
tions for legal recognition of the family soon came to hinge on the provision
of nurturance, emotional support, and other life necessities within the family
grouping However, as set forth below,' the provision of that care was still
deeply gendered, prompting calls for additional reform designed to achieve
gender equality within the family.
A. Eliminating Official Gender Roles
Family law scholars have praised the family law revolution that, over the
past forty years, has eliminated most official gender role distinctions within
the family. Prior to the revolution, family law in the United States envi-
sioned a deeply gendered family.9 As Martha Fineman has summarized,
"IT]he sexes had distinct and well-defined gender roles: husbands were eco-
nomic providers, disciplinarians, and the heads of families, while wives
were nurturers, caretakers, and subservient to their husbands."' This con-
ception of the family changed dramatically in the 1970s," in large part due
to grassroots calls for increased gender equality throughout society. 2 Re-
sponding to such pressure, legislators and courts began to eliminate or
overturn laws that mandated official gender roles within the family. 3
Currently, with the exception of opposite-sex marriage requirements,
family law does not restrict family functions to one gender or another.
Rather, both men and women are permitted, and often required, to perform
all of the functions traditionally reserved for (male) husbands and (female)
6. See JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND
WHAT TO Do ABOUT It 14-39 (2000). For examples of how this discourse continues to dominate
discussions of family, see sources cited infra note 121.
7. See id.; see also infra note 78 (listing sources discussing functional approaches to defin-
ing family).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 9-39; see also infra text accompanying notes 102-
122.
9. For more discussion of the gendered nature of marriage, see infra Section H.C. 1.
10. Martha Albertson Fineman, Progress and Progression in Family Law, 2004 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 1, 2; see also COTT, supra note 4, at 7 ("Marriage decisively differentiated the positions of
husband and wife.").
11. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC
AND REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM 1-13, 17-35 (1991).
12. For a description of this grassroots activism, see SARA EVANS, PERSONAL POLITICS: THE
ROOTS OF WOMEN'S LIBERATION IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND THE NEW LEFT 18-19
(1979).
13. See, e.g., LINDA C. MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES: FOSTERING CAPACITY, EQUAL-
ITY, AND RESPONSIBILITY 60-61 (2006); Susan Frelich Appleton, Missing in Action? Searching for
Gender Talk in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 16 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 97, 110-14 (2005);
Naomi R. Cahn, The Moral Complexities of Family Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 225, 270-71 (1997).
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wives or (female) mothers and (male) fathers.' 4 In other words, once a fam-
ily is recognized by the state, the law no longer assigns legal functions to its
members according to restrictive notions of gender roles. Women can now
perform the functions traditionally reserved for husbands, men can perform
the functions traditionally reserved for wives, and both mothers and fathers
are eligible to perform the whole range of parenting functions. Family law
has thus "moved from a patriarchal structure to a model of formal gender
equality with an emphasis on rights of individuals within the family."'"
Many family law scholars view this revolution as "the most significant
and pervasive transformation" of family law.' 6 And it is tempting, for schol-
ars and the public alike, to equate gender neutrality with gender equality. 7
Indeed, some scholars assume that a gender-neutral family is a just family, 8
at least to the extent that gender-neutral laws permit individuals to make
choices about their family roles free from state intervention. 9 Other schol-
ars, however, emphasize that gender-neutral laws have not lead to gender
equality within most families .
Concern about the actual effect of gender-neutral laws often turns on di-
verging views of whether formal equality can lead to substantive equality.
Some of these concerns hinge on a sense of timing-the time it will take for
formal equality to lead to substantive equality and what should be done in
the interim. Others hinge on a concern that formal equality may never be
enough to transform many, if not all, aspects of domestic family life. For
14. See, e.g., Appleton, supra note 13, at 113-14; Jana B. Singer, The Privitization of Family
Law, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 1443, 1517-22. Specific contexts include the elimination of different rules
for women and men for purposes of alimony, child custody, property management, and estate over-
sight. Appleton, supra note 13, at 113.
15. Linda J. Lacey, Mimicking the Words, but Missing the Message: The Misuse of Cultural
Feminist Themes in Religion and Family Law Jurisprudence, 35 B.C. L. REV. 1, 2 (1993); see also
Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminism and Family Law, 33 FAM. L.Q. 475, 475 (1999) ("Feminism's prin-
cipal contribution to the law of the family in the United States has been to open up that institution to
critical scrutiny and question the justice of a legal regime that has permitted, even reinforced, the
subordination of some family members to others.").
16. Appleton, supra note 13, at 110.
17. June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Autonomy to Choose what Constitutes Family: Oxymoron
or Basic Right? II (Santa Clara Univ. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No.
06-12 & George Washington Univ. Law Sch. Pub. Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series and
Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 225), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=935418.
("The new middle class morality emphasizes the financial contributions of mothers and fathers, and
it celebrates marriage in terms of equality and companionship."); Fineman, supra note 10, at 7-8
("The legal relationship between husband and wife has been completely rewritten in gender neutral,
equality aspiring terms .... Most women, indeed most people, whether they identify themselves as
feminist or not, benefit from and generally approve of such manifestations of gender equality.").
18. SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 172-82 (1989).
19. See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Saving the Family from the Reformers, 31 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 809, 815-16 (1998).
20. See infra text accompanying notes 21-39.
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instance, both types of questions arise in the context of divorce. At least for
several years after the advent of gender-neutral divorce and alimony laws,
most middle-class wives continued to forego full-time wage work in order to
engage in childcare and other care work, leaving them with limited bargain-
ing power upon divorce. Jill Hasday, among others, has analyzed how these
women were harmed by state legislatures' assumptions that divorce law no
longer needed to take women's particular status into account upon divorce
but simply needed to treat both spouses equally.2' Hasday uses this example
to urge family law scholars to continue to work toward the goal of gender
equality instead of assuming that equality has already been achieved
2through gender-neutral laws.
Other concerns about the effects of gender-neutral laws go beyond de-
bates about formal and substantive equality. These concerns are grounded in
a consideration of the power of the existing boundaries of the legal family.
Scholars engaged in this type of critique examine how the law's placement
of certain relationships and activities outside of the legal family could itself• 23
perpetuate gender inequality. Although family law has eliminated official
gender distinctions within the family, the law's policing of the boundaries of
the family could still perpetuate gender inequality. The rest of this Article
will consider these dynamics.
B. Recognizing the Power of Boundaries
Many scholars have emphasized that the current parameters of family law
stigmatize various groups. This argument is most frequently made with re-
spect to most states' refusal to extend marriage, and often adoption rights, to
same-sex couples.24 The law's refusal to recognize same-sex couples means
that gender roles are still meaningful to family law even if explicit gender role
25distinctions within the family have been eliminated. If family law had fully
embraced gender equality, these scholars contend, there would be no need to
26
mandate that spouses or parents choose opposite-sex partners.
21. Hasday, supra note 1, at 866-70; see also LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVO-
LUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN
AMERICA 16-41,323-56 (1985).
22. Hasday, supra note 1, at 870 ("Social equality is an important goal for family law, yet
announcing its achievement is premature. Instead, a crucial question in any family law debate has to
be whether the particular proposal at issue is consistent with equality or not.").
23. See infra Section I.B.
24. See, e.g., Andrew Koppleman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men is Sex
Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197, 219 (1994).
25. Id. at 218-19.
26. See, e.g., Sandi Farrell, Reconsidering the Gender-Equality Perspective for Understand-
ing LGBT Rights, 13 LAW & SEXUALITY 605, 623 (2004); Andrew Koppelman, The Miscegenation
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Indeed, such opposite-sex marriage requirements constitute sex dis-
crimination on their face,27 in contrast to the commitment to formal equality
found within other areas of family law.28 In 1993, the Supreme Court of
Hawai'i held that the state's opposite-sex marriage requirements violated the
Hawai'i constitution's equal rights amendment.29 Other states, however, in-
cluding those states that have begun to recognize same-sex marriage or
other same-sex intimate relationships," have refused to acknowledge the
tension between opposite-sex requirements and the states' commitment to
gender equality within the family.3 The gendered prerequisites of marriage
are seen as unrelated to family law's goal of achieving gender equality,
thereby permitting the boundaries of the legal family to continue to perpetu-
ate gender inequality.
Other scholars have extended this argument about the boundaries of the
legal family to other groups of people, including unmarried opposite-sex
cohabitants, unmarried cohabitants whose living arrangements do not in-
volve sex, and single and other unmarried parents. Although formal gender
distinctions are not the cause of these groups' placement outside family
law's privileged family forms, women and their children in these "outsider"
family forms tend to suffer disproportionately more than similarly situated
men. For example, Martha Fineman has focused much of her work on the
ways unmarried mothers are harmed by states' decisions to allocate many
social benefits to married couples instead of to parents." Vivian Hamilton
has similarly argued that family law should not privilege marriage over
Analogy: Sodomy Law as Sex Discrimination, 98 YALE L.J. 145, 160 (1988); Sylvia A. Law, Homo-
sexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 187, 188, 231-32.
27. Appleton, supra note 13, at 103 (describing litigation arguments in the 1970s).
28. See supra text accompanying notes 14-15.
29. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 159 (Haw. 1993), superseded by constitutional amendment,
HAW. CONST. amend. I, § 23.
30. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5 (2004 & Supp. 2007) (extending recognition to registered
domestic partners); 2005 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-38nn (2007) (extending recognition to couples in
registered civil unions); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 1-201(10-A) (Supp. 2006) (extending
family recognition with respect to inheritance rights to registered domestic partners); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 26:8A (West 2007) (extending partial family recognition to registered domestic partners);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204 (2002) (extending family recognition to couples in registered civil
unions); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969-70 (Mass. 2003) (recognizing
same sex marriage).
31. For example, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts's decision in Goodridge,
which ultimately recognized same-sex marriage, did not address whether opposite-sex marriage
requirements violated the state's equal rights amendment. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 961.
32. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAM-
ILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 117-89, 213-17, 226-35 (1995); Martha
Albertson Fineman, Why Marriage?, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 239, 244-46 (2001). Writing outside
of family law, Rachel Moran has made a similar critique. Rachel F. Moran, How Second-Wave
Feminism Forgot the Single Woman, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 223, 285 (2004) ("[M]arriage is seen as
the sole model for a functional family structure.").
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other forms of companionate relationships that engage in dependent caregiv-
ing, which is generally performed by women.33 These scholars emphasize
that the existing boundaries of the legal family fail to encompass the diverse
ways that families function, and therefore states support some families more
than others.
The acknowledgment that state constructions and recognition of mar-
riage privilege some family forms over others has caused some family law
scholars to question whether advocating for same-sex marriage is wise, de-
spite its appeal as a matter of formal gender equality. As Nancy Polikoff has
written, an agenda focused on extending marriage to same-sex couples
would mean that "[m]arriage would be touted as the solution to these cou-
ples' problems; the limitations of marriage, and of a social system valuing
one form of human relationship above all others, would be downplayed. 34
In making this argument, Polikoff is emphasizing two aspects of the lim-
its of family law's embrace of gender neutrality. First, like Hasday, Polikoff
is emphasizing that formal gender equality with respect to who is eligible to
marry will not necessarily lead to substantive gender equality because "the
limitations of marriage" would likely remain.35 But Polikoff goes further,
emphasizing a second point related to gender equality: the possibility that an
expansion of marriage to encompass more couples might further stigmatize
36those who embrace only some of the aspects of traditional marriage. As
Fineman and Hamilton have emphasized, women are particularly likely to
be harmed by a "social system valuing one form of human relationship
above all others,"37 because women often perform carework outside of the
boundaries of marriage, and that carework is not supported when the state
privileges marriage over all other forms of relationship.3 s
Polikoff is thus concerned about more than supporting same-sex couples
who, but for gender, function in the same ways as opposite-sex married cou-
ples. Such support could signal the states' view that marriage is a superior
way of living, whereas Polikoff emphasizes that she "do[es] not believe that
33. Vivian Hamilton, Mistaking Marriage for Social Policy, II VA. J. Soc. POL'v & L. 307,
368-70 (2004).
34. Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian
Marriage Will Not "Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage," 79 VA. L. REV.
1535, 1546 (1993).
35. Id.
36. Id. (emphasizing the harm of "valuing one form of human relationship above all others").
37. Id.
38. Instead, much state support currently hinges on marriage, as Fineman and Hamilton
emphasize. See supra text accompanying notes 32-33.
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marriage is an inherently more valuable relationship than others, including
non-conjugal relationships characterized by care and/or interdependence.""
Some queer theorists have made similar critiques of the campaigns for
same-sex marriage, emphasizing that the campaigns reinforce existing in-
centives for individuals to prioritize marriage over other ways of life. As
Katherine Franke recently wrote, "the rights-bearing subject of the lesbigay
rights movement has now become 'the couple'-a We. It is a domesticated
couple, and it is a couple that seeks a particular location within a genealogi-
cal kinship grid that sutures the couple to the nation."'' When same-sex
couples argue that they are harmed by their exclusion from marriage, they
often reinforce marriage's privileged status. For example, Franke empha-
sizes that "[w]hile the zone of the non-married parent is portrayed as a site
of pathology, stigma, and injury to children, marriage is figured as the ideal
social formation in which responsible reproduction can and should take
place. 4' Or, as Michael Warner has written, "[m]arriage sanctifies some
couples at the expense of others. It is selective legitimacy.
42
Queer theorists have thus argued that the quest for same-sex marriage is
not just misguided but also harmful to many people currently living outside
of marriage, because calls for same-sex marriage reinforce marriage as "the
zone of privacy outside of which sex is unprotected. 43 Under these condi-
tions, marriage is not "merely one choice among others,'" nor is it merely
an individual choice. Rather, marriage is the privileged choice, and each
time that choice is made, it reinforces both the privilege of the couple and
the corresponding stigmatization of others. Sexual pleasure and expression
is thereby limited by the state's encouragement of stable, long-term cou-
pling within the confines of marriage.46
39. Nancy D. Polikoff, Making Marriage Matter Less: The ALl Domestic Partner Principles
Are One Step In The Right Direction, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 353, 366.
40. Katherine M. Franke, The Politics of Same-Sex Marriage Politics, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER
& L. 236, 239 (2006).
41. Id. at 242; see also JUDITH BUTLER, UNDOING GENDER 104 (2004) (emphasizing that
the state's offer of same-sex marriage "might result in the intensification of normalization").
42. Michael Warner, Beyond Gay Marriage, in LEFr LEGALISM / LEFT CRITIQUE 259, 260
(Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002).
43. Id. at 267. Warner further describes reasons why opposition to marriage "lay at the heart
of an ethical vision of queer politics." Id. at 264-65.
44. Id. at 267; see also Claudia Card, Against Marriage and Motherhood, I I HYPATIA, Sum-
mer 1996, at 1, 7 (describing marriage under current conditions as "not a totally free choice").
45. Cf Warner, supra note 42, at 274 (describing marriage's consequences for the unmarried).
46. See id. at 277 ("Marriage, in short, would make for good gays: the kind who would not
challenge the norms of straight culture, who would not flaunt sexuality, and who would not insist on
living differently from ordinary folk."); id. at 279 ("Too many activists see marriage only as a way
of overcoming the stigma on identity and are willing to ignore-or even celebrate-the way it rein-
forces all of the other damaging hierarchies of shame around sex.").
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Polikoff's work goes beyond these arguments to emphasize that more
than sexual freedom-or multiple forms of sexual pleasure-is at stake
when the state privileges marriage. Rather, like Fineman and Hamilton,
Polikoff emphasizes that the state also signals that it is most willing to sup-
port carework performed within marriage.47 Those performing carework
outside legal marriage, including in "non-conjugal relationships character-
ized by care and/or interdependence," are stigmatized both by the current
boundaries of the legal family and by proposed boundaries that would ex-
tend legal recognition to same-sex couples.
C. Continuing to Privilege Comprehensive Domestic Relationships
Conceptions of family like those embraced by Fineman, Hamilton, and
Polikoff go a long way toward acknowledging how the boundaries of family
law can maintain hierarchies and inequality, even as the substance of family
law attempts to embrace a norm of equality. As Polikoff highlights, the dis-
course of marriage privileges conjugality and romantic attachment over
nonconjugal care relationships. Similarly, Fineman and Hamilton question
why states should give more support to caregiving relationships that are
linked to marriages than to caregiving relationships that are not tied to ongo-
ing sexual relationships. The work of all three scholars illustrates how the
boundaries of family law may encourage individuals to enter certain types
of conjugal relationships in order to conform to the way of life privileged by
legal recognition.
However, sexual attachment is not the only attribute of family life privi-
leged by the current boundaries of family law. Rather, dependent care and
interdependence are also privileged. Fineman, Hamilton, and Polikoff rein-
force this privilege by implying that domestic caregiving should be the
essential element of the states' definitions of family. Pursuant to their views,
sexual or romantic attachment should not be a vital ingredient of family-
indeed, sexual relations can be expendable-but care of others within the
home should remain vital to our understanding of family. Fineman,
Hamilton, and Polikoff thereby reinscribe the boundary of the legal family
even as they attempt to expand that boundary beyond marriage and conju-
gality to include nonconjugal, interdependent caregiving relationships.
Family law scholars have not examined how this focus on caregiving
within the home could privilege some family forms over others. This silence
could be seen as evidence that most family law scholars would view such
domestic caregiving as replacing sexual or romantic attachment as the defin-
ing element of the new family. Or the silence could reveal that many family
47. Polikoff, supra note 34, at 1546.
48. Polikoff, supra note 39, at 366.
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law scholars implicitly believe that domestic caregiving is the most impor-
tant aspect of even the current sexual family. 9 In any event, no family law
scholar has yet considered how a focus on domestic caregiving could stig-
matize those individuals living outside of domestic caregiving relationships.
Therefore, individuals not involved in a dependency relationship or not
sharing a home, or both, remain outside of even alternative definitions of the
family. This construction of family assumes that people living on their own
care for no one but themselves. ° In addition, so-called single parents are
assumed to care only for their children, and these parents are assumed to
perform that task alone. Other forms of care provided outside of the home
are largely ignored.5
When viewed in this manner, family law has not changed as dramati-
cally from the days of "domestic relations" as is generally assumed. The
home is still the organizing structure for family. 2 Moreover, the law still
addresses hierarchies within the home, although those hierarchies are no
longer always seen as natural or inevitable but instead are acknowledged as
the product of shifting needs throughout the life course. Both existing and
proposed constructions of the legal family address how members of
households meet those needs by either giving or receiving care, thereby cre-
ating and sustaining interdependent ways of life. Individuals outside of the
49. Carol Sanger, arguing against the privatization of marriage, indicates that she has already
adopted such a view:
But how customized can a marriage contract be before it falls outside the marital regime all to-
gether? Is there a list of topics or terms that must be included before the arrangement is not
marriage but something else, something perhaps closer to an employment contract or a prop-
erty transfer or a 'friendship pact? Must the contracting parties reside together or be
economically interdependent? Must there be provision for mutual support?
Carol Sanger, A Case for Civil Marriage, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1311, 1316 (2006). Of obvious
interest to the argument here is the fact that Sanger leaves sex out of the equation, focusing sol ely on
cohabitation and economic and emotional interdependency. Id. Other family law scholars, in con-
trast, have continued to analyze marriage as a site of sexual regulation. See, e.g., Carbone & Cahn,
supra note 17, at 26 (discussing how much of the country engages in a "continuing celebration of
the unity of marriage, sex and procreation"); Ariela R. Dubler, Immoral Purposes: Marriage and the
Genus of Illicit Sex, 115 YALE L.J. 756, 763 (2006) (discussing historical and contemporary notion
of marriage "as the site where lust was transformed into virtue").
50. And, indeed, "self care" may not be regarded as "care" at all.
51. A few family law scholars have begun to examine childrearing performed outside of the
home by nonparental actors, but that work has not yet been incorporated into family law discourse.
See Melissa Murray, The Networked Family, VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008); Laura A. Rosenbury,
Between Home and School, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 833 (2007).
52. And, indeed, analyses of the household continue to provide much insight into the organi-
zation of private life. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Unpacking the Household: Informal Property
Rights Around the Hearth, 116 YALE L. J. 226 (2006). Family law's focus on the home, however, is
not inevitable but rather is a function of the current construction of family law. If the current focus
on the home provides insight into private life, so might a focus on activities not tied to the home.
This is particularly true if family law scholars wish to construct family law so that it more equally
addresses the needs of diverse populations.
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household remain invisible, even if they too provide various forms of care
and support to those within.
II. THE PLACE OF FRIENDSHIP
Given family law's focus on domestic caregiving within the home, it is
not surprising that friendship has been largely ignored by family law schol-
ars. Friendship is generally viewed as utterly distinct from domesticity and
hence from family. Friends are assumed to share a home only at times of
family limbo, for instance in the years between leaving a childhood home
and establishing a home with a sexual partner or one's own children. In ad-
dition, dependency is often seen as anathema to friendship. Instead,
friendship is often assumed to embody norms of equality and autonomy.
These cultural understandings of friendship and family may explain why
family law has overlooked friendship, but they do not answer the question of
whether family law should continue to place friendship outside of its do-
main. Because family law is a state construction, the state could shift away
from the current focus on domestic caregiving within the home. There is no
reason why the state must maintain a strict divide between family and
friends, a divide that places friends, acquaintances, and strangers alike in the
nonfamily category, thereby obscuring the ways that friends are more like
family than strangers. Indeed, legal scholars in other fields have recognized
that friendship and family are not as distinct as many may think. For exam-
ple, in delineating the elements of intimate associations protected from
undue state interference, Kenneth Karst acknowledged that "the idea of in-
timate association also includes close friendships." 3 The values underlying
state respect of intimate association-identified by Karst as including soci-
ety, caring and commitment, intimacy, and self-identification 14-are present
not only in marriages, parent-child relationships, or other groupings of rela-
tives but can also be present in friendships. 5 Therefore, under our
constitutional scheme, the state must permit such friendships to exist.
Permitting relationships to exist is, of course, very different from sup-
porting such relationships. Family law's silence with respect to friendship
53. Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 629 (1980);
see also id. at 629 n.26 ("The law, of course, largely ignores relationships among friends, but it is
plain that the values of intimate association may be realized in friendships involving neither sexual
intimacy nor family ties. Any view of intimate association focused on associational values must
therefore include friendship.").
54. Id. at 630-37.
55. Id. at 629; cf Developments in the Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 1156, 1216-1218 (1980) ("While the Court has stated that formal marriage and blood relations
are factors that aid in the identification of protected family relationships, it has clearly implied that
neither of these bonds is necessary to satisfy the state's interest in ensuring that children receive the
care and support essential to their healthy development." (footnote omitted)).
[Vol. 106:189
Friends with Benefits
sends potentially conflicting messages about the state's view of friendship.
The silence can signal freedom to enter into diverse relationships, or it can
signal that such relationships are unworthy of state recognition.56 Friendship
is thus already regulated by the state in some ways.57 The construction of
family law matters to friendship, and friendship matters to family law, as
described below.
A. The Law's Role in Defining Friendship
Although the law has traditionally placed friendship outside of its do-
main, the law matters to friendship. In the views of many, the benefits of
friendship derive from its "out-law" status. s Indeed, when I have mentioned
to friends and colleagues that I am writing about friendship, many have in-
stantly recoiled, asking: "You're not going to call for the regulation of
friendship, are you?" Implicit in the question is the belief that friendship
thrives outside of legal regulation.
Why is lack of regulation perceived to be good for friendship? On the
most basic level, the state does not specify the terms of friendship, leaving it
up to individuals to define the interaction. This creates multidimensional
freedom. On one level, the state imposes no obligations on friends; there-
fore, any obligations arise from the parties themselves.59 On another level,
the state does not privilege one definition of friendship over another. Many
types of friendships can develop and coexist, and individual friendships can
56. Family law is not alone in undervaluing friendship. See LILLIAN B. RUBIN, JUST
FRIENDS (1985) (describing how society in general undervalues friendship when it gives priority to
romantic and familial bonds).
57. Cf Anne C. Dailey, Constitutional Privacy and the Just Family, 67 TUL. L. REV. 955,
956 (1993) ("Far from prohibiting state intervention in a prepolitical social sphere, the ideal of
family privacy expresses a particular set of family values by protecting only those social relations
that the state deems worth protecting.").
58. For examples of this inclination, see MARILYN FRIEDMAN, WHAT ARE FRIENDS FOR?
FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS AND MORAL THEORY 248 (1993) ("No con-
sanguineal or legal connections formally establish or maintain ties of friendship. As this relationship
is widely understood in our culture, its basis lies in voluntary choice."); Ethan J. Leib, Friendship &
the Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 631, 663 (2007) ("[Wie tend to think of our friendships as quintessen-
tially voluntary and the law as quintessentially coercive. Allowing the law to penetrate friendship in
any way might threaten friendship's core and undermine its defining characteristic."(footnote omit-
ted)).
59. Moreover, the state would probably enforce contractual obligations between friends
more readily than intrafamily contracts, viewing friends as strangers before the law. Cf. Jennifer A.
Drobac & Antony Page, A Uniform Domestic Partnership Act: Marrying Business Partnership and
Family Law, 41 GA. L. REV. 349, 402-17 (2007) (proposing that family law permit individuals to
structure their relationships pursuant to traditional business partnership principles).
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be fluid and shifting.60 This freedom to define friendship pursuant to one's
own terms means that definitions of friendship that attempt to be more
specific than Karst's are often unhelpful and unduly restrictive.6' This Arti-
cle attempts to respect that freedom by focusing on individuals who self-
identify as friends.
Although the freedom to define friendship in diverse ways is attractive
and powerful, it is incorrect to view it as flowing from lack of state regula-
tion. Instead, as discussed below, the placement of friendship outside of the
legal family is a decision of the state. Some individuals may choose to em-
brace friendship in an attempt to escape the power of the state, but such
escape can be only partial because the state has created the very divide
sought to be exploited. Friendships are thus not intrinsically free relation-
ships; rather, their freedom derives in part from the state, and that freedom is
limited by various state decisions.
1. The Limits of Friendship's "Out-Law" Status
The law currently intervenes in friendships in multiple ways. First, the
law intervenes by refusing to recognize the desires of friends in various con-
texts. The most obvious context is in the denial of various benefits that the
law reserves for family. Even if friends are performing many, or all, of the
functions traditionally ascribed to spouses, parents, or children, friends are
not eligible, for example, to take leave to care for each other pursuant to the
Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 62 to require hospitals to allow
them to visit each other or to make decisions about each other's medical63
care, to bring a viable suit for negligent infliction of emotional distress
when they witness the other being harmed, 64 or to inherit each other's estates
60. This does not mean, however, that friendship is free from all cultural influences. Most
notably, as set forth infra Section IlI.C, most friendships are believed to be shaped at least to some
degree by the gender of their participants.
61. For more discussion of the danger of definitions of both friendship and family, see infra
text accompanying note 185.
62. Only spouses, parents, and children are eligible for leave under the FMLA. 29 U.S.C.
§ 2612 (2000).
63. Of course, friends can engage in private contracting (most commonly in the form of
health care proxies or durable powers of attorney) that is generally respected by medical profession-
als. In the absence of formal private agreements, however, states rarely permit friends to make
medical care decisions for each other when one of them is incapacitated; instead, states generally
designate family members to make such decisions. ALAN MEISEL & KATHY L. CERMINARA, THE
RIGHT TO DIE: THE LAW OF END-OF-LIFE DECISION MAKING § 8.01 (3d ed. 2005). Some jurisdic-
tions recognize the ability of a friend to stand in for family members for those purposes, but friends
become eligible for that recognition only if no members of the immediate family are available or
willing to take on such duties. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 21-2210(a) (2007).
64. See, e.g., Kallstrom v. United States, 43 P.3d 162, 165 (Alaska 2002) (stating that a
"blood relationship" is required for such claims); Kately v. Wilkinson, 195 Cal. Rptr. 902, 903 (Cal.
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under state intestacy rules. 65 Thus, friendships are not supported by the
states in much the same way that same-sex couples have traditionally lacked
support. Of course, not all friends would want state recognition, but those
who would are denied benefits that the states bestow on other types of inti-
mate adult relationships.
In addition to the denial of these public or quasi-public benefits, states
also intervene in friendships by refusing to recognize certain private agree-
ments that hinge on notions of friendship. 66 An example can be found in the
context of private express trusts. In order for such a trust to be valid, the
67beneficiaries of the trust must be identifiable and ascertainable. When the
settlor directs her trustee to distribute property to the settlor's "family" or
"relatives," the states honor the trust because the beneficiaries are viewed as
68
clearly identifiable. When the settlor instead directs her trustee to distribute
property to the settlor's "friends," the trust fails for lack of an identifiable
and ascertainable beneficiary:
The word "friends," unlike "relations," has no accepted statutory or other
controlling limitations, and in fact has no precise sense at all. Friendship is
a word of broad and varied application. It is commonly used to describe
the undefinable relationships which exist, not only between those con-
nected by ties of kinship or marriage, but as well between strangers in
blood, and which vary in degree from the greatest intimacy to an acquaint-
ance more or less casual. 69
Ct. App. 1983) ("We conclude that where, as here, the relationship is not a family relationship but
one akin to a family relationship because of friendship and past associations, the relationship guide-
line is not satisfied."); Blanyar v. Pagnotti Enters., 679 A.2d 790, 794 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (holding
that the allegation that the plaintiff and victim were "'close friends.'.. . is an insufficient basis for
recovery for the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress as a matter of law" because "[tihe
plaintiff is not a member of the victim's immediate family, and ... there is no averment that the
boys lived together as a family unit"); Hinojosa v. S. Tex. Drilling & Exploration, Inc., 727 S.W.2d
320, 324 (Tex. App. 1987) (holding that plaintiff failed to state a claim because he had "not alleged
any relationship or association between himself and [the victim] other than that of co-worker and
close friend").
65. Instead, if the decedent leaves no kin, her estate escheats to the state. See, e.g., Mo. REV.
STAT. § 474.010 (2000). Friends can execute wills leaving property to each other, but in the absence
of validly executed wills, friends are not entitled to any part of their deceased friends' estates.
66. In contrast, courts have recognized other agreements between friends even when those
agreements did not contain all of the formalities required of contract. See Leib, supra note 58, at
687-92.
67. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 456.4-402 (2000).
68. See, e.g., Clark v. Campbell, 133 A. 166, 170 (N.H. 1926).
69. Id. at 170. This is an old case, but its age provides support for the phenomenon I de-
scribe: the bias against friendship is so established that no competent lawyer would draft a trust
leaving property to a settlor's "friends." Instead, the lawyer would specifically list the names of the
friends in question. However, competent lawyers still regularly draft trusts that leave property to a
settlor's "family" or "relatives."
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As a general matter, states will not honor such a trust even if the settlor had
provided instructions to the trustee (outside of the trust document) about the
friends to be included in the class, or if the trustee otherwise had knowledge
of who should be considered the settlor's friends.70
When I teach cases about this issue in my Trusts and Estates class, most
of my students agree with the states' decisions to reject such trusts, even my
students who otherwise support expanding state inheritance laws' definitions
of spouse and child in order to permit individuals who function as family,
but do not enjoy the legal status of family, to share in a decedent's estate.
When I push back and ask why the trustee could not use a functional test to
determine the identity of the settlor's friends (as well as to make distinctions
among friends that would justify the distribution of variable amounts and
types of property), my students respond that such a test is impossible. They
argue friendship is too amorphous to be subjected to a functional test, be-
cause there are too many types of friends, and it is too easy for an individual
to claim she is a friend when she in fact is not. Family is a simple category,
whereas friendship is incapable of definition.
The instincts of my students point to a paradox of friendship. Friendship
thrives on lack of state recognition, but that lack also makes friendship sus-
pect. 7 ' The placement of friendship outside the law gives individuals the
freedom to experience multiple forms of friendship and to create new forms
of friendship, but that freedom also means that individuals can view friend-
ship as more open to fraud than those intimate adult relationships
recognized by the state. The state, by omission, defines friendship as a rela-
tionship with no legally enforceable obligations, and that definition
necessarily shapes the benefits, risks, and experience of friendship for all.
However, friendships are not permanently outside of the realm of legally
enforceable obligations. Instead, the law also intervenes in friendships by
setting outer boundaries: marriage and, increasingly, marriage-like relation-
ships. If friends obtain a marriage license or, in some states, if a friendship
(generally opposite-sex) takes on the qualities of a marriage-like relation-
ship through sexual cohabitation, then it is no longer a friendship in the
law's eyes. Rather, a friend in such a friendship can appeal to the state and
often receive benefits reserved for parties in marriage and marriage-like re-
lationships.72
70. Id. at 171.
71. Cf PETA BOWDEN, CARING: GENDER-SENSITIVE ETHICS 60 (1997) (describing friendship
as "a sphere of social activity that is both exhilaratingly free from regulation and profoundly fragile").
72. Wilbur v. DeLapp, 850 P.2d 1151, 1153 (Or. App. 1993) (exercising equitable powers to
divide the property of a non-married, formerly cohabitating opposite-sex couple pursuant to marital
partnership principles); Vasquez v. Hawthorne, 33 P.3d 735, 737 (Wash. 2001) (extending default
rules governing marital property division to cohabitating same-sex couples); Connell v. Francisco,
898 P.2d 831, 834-36 (Wash. 1995) (extending default rules governing marital property division to
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2. Consequences of the Law's Role
Given the law's role in creating the distinction between friendship and
marriage, friendship has been experienced differently by straight and gay
communities. Because gay men and lesbians have traditionally been denied
same-sex marriage, the line between friendship and romance or between
friendship and family is not as stark in many gay and lesbian communities
as it is in straight culture.73 In addition, friendship is less likely to be implic-
itly devalued by comparisons to marriage.14 Sociologist Sasha Roseneil has
summarized these phenomena:
For some lesbians and gay men the boundary between friends and lovers is
not clear and shifts over time-friends become lovers, and lovers become
friends-and many have multiple sexual partners of varying degrees of
commitment (and none). These practices de-centre the primary signifi-
cance that is commonly granted to sexual partnerships and the privileging
of conjugal relationships, and suggests to us the importance of thinking
beyond the conjugal imaginary.7 5
In contrast, straight culture has, at least until recently, perpetuated a
strict divide between individuals who are viewed as dating and those who
are "just friends. 76 This distinction implies that the dating relationship may
lead to the privileged state of marriage, whereas the friendship will not. Re-
cently, the distinction has been blurred somewhat with the popularity of the
cohabitating opposite-sex couples). The American Law Institute has proposed that states intervene
in such friendships more often, unless the parties explicitly contract out of the states' involvement.
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS §§ 6.01-6.06
(2002) (proposing that its model family dissolution default rules be extended to all couples cohabi-
tating for a specified period, barring agreements to the contrary).
73. For discussions of the importance of friendship in the lives of lesbians and gay men, see
PETER M. NARDI, GAY MEN'S FRIENDSHIPS: INVINCIBLE COMMUNITIES (1999); JEFFREY WEEKS,
INVENTED MORALITIES: SEXUAL VALUES IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY (1995); JEFFREY WEEKS ET
AL., SAME SEX INTIMACIES: FAMILIES OF CHOICE AND OTHER LIFE EXPERIMENTS (2001); and KATH
WESTON, FAMILIES WE CHOOSE: LESBIANS, GAYS, AND KINSHIP (1991).
74. For a (most likely unconscious) devaluation of friendship in comparison to marriage, see
Leib, supra note 58, at 681 n.260 ("The fact that many friendships dwindle is well known, and it is
not necessarily the symptom of a flawed friendship. People move away, get married, have kids, get
rich, become poor, change jobs, change interests-and all of these circumstantial changes can affect
our friendship networks." (emphasis added)).
75. Sasha Roseneil, Why We Should Care About Friends: An Argument for Queering the
Care Imaginary in Social Policy, 3 Soc. POL'Y & Soc'Y 409, 411 (2004).
76. Id. at 410-15. Ethan Leib continues to perpetuate this divide in his recent work on
friendship and the law. Leib, supra note 58, at 639 ("Friendship is not kinship, and if a relationship
is one of kinship, it cannot also be classified as a friendship. Friends may not be related by blood or
marriage, and they may not engage in any ongoing sexual relationship."); id. at 640 ("Romantic
love, familial love, and sex might confound an analysis of friendship proper."). Leib's ten criteria for
friendship, however, id. at 642-47, are all criteria that are commonly used to describe lovers and that
have been employed to argue for legal recognition of functional families.
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term "friends with benefits."" In contrast to "just friends," this term implies
that the relationship embodies at least one of the attributes of marriage,
namely sex. In many ways, this term devalues friendship even more than the
term "just friends" because it implies that friendship has no benefits unless
sex is involved. At the same time, the term also safely maintains the privi-
leging of marriage and dating relationships that might lead to marriage.
After all, "friends with benefits" are still "just" friends, implying that sex
alone does not place a relationship on the path to marriage.
These differences in the experiences of friendship in turn reinforce the
fact that friendship is not inherently free. Instead, freedom is conferred, and
limited, by the decision of the state to recognize some relationships and not
others. The state's distinction between friendship and legal marriage affects
friendship as well as marriage, by defining marriage in opposition to other
adult intimate relationships, including friendship. The next Sections exam-
ine the functions of friendship and compare them to legal marriage in order
to ascertain what the state privileges, and what it overlooks, when it recog-
nizes family to the exclusion of friendship.
B. The Functions of Friendship
Family law potentially has much to gain by considering friendship at
this point in time. Family law has long embraced two additional goals be-
yond the goal of achieving individual autonomy and gender equality within
the family. One of those additional goals is to reflect and support the ways
people actually live their lives.7 8 The other is to foster pluralism by permit-
ting individuals to explore diverse ways of living in our society.7 9 An
analysis of the functions of friendship reveals that family law could more
77. The term gradually became widely used in various social settings after it appeared in
Alanis Morissette's song "Head over Feet," released as a single in 1996.
78. This principle is best illustrated by functional approaches to the family. For examples,
see Martha Minow, All in the Family & In All Families: Membership, Loving, and Owing, 95 W. VA.
L. REV. 275, 287-88 (1992-93); Martha Minow, Redefining Families: Who's In and Who's Out?, 62
U. COLO. L. REV. 269, 270-72 (1991); Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers:
Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional
Families, 78 GEo. L.J. 459, 483-91 (1990); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "It All Depends on What
You Mean by Home": Toward a Communitarian Theory of the "Nontraditional" Family, 1996 UTAH
L. REV. 569, 576-84; Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Towards a Revitalization of Family Law, 69
TEX. L. REV. 245, 279-80 (1990).
79. E.g., Dailey, supra note 57, at 958-59 (discussing the role families play "in maintaining
the diverse moral values and traditions that comprise the pluralist foundation of our liberal political
order, values and traditions that in tum serve to counter the threat that unmediated state power poses
to moral diversity"); Peggy Cooper Davis, Contested Images of Family Values: The Role of the State,
107 HARV. L. REV. 1348, 1371 (1994) ("People are not meant to be socialized to uniform, externally
imposed values. People are to be able to form families and other intimate communities within which




fully achieve these goals, as well as the goal of gender equality, if it consid-
ered friendship. As set forth below, friendship is an increasingly important
aspect of many people's lives. In addition, many of these people prefer to
experience personal connection, and give and receive care, through friend-
ship rather than family. Finally, friends are often capable of sustaining such
connections while simultaneously maintaining aspects of individual auton-
omy and equality that can be elusive in domestic coupling. Accordingly,
family law has much to gain by considering friendship.
Sociologists have long studied friendship, but recent sociological re-
search shows the increased importance of friendship, particularly among
"those at the cutting edge of processes of individualization."8 These schol-
ars emphasize that friendship, like many categories of experience, including
family, is a social construction that shifts over time. In the mid-twentieth
century, the apex of friendship was embodied in the "companionate intimate
heterosexual couple," which was viewed as the "primary arena of inti-
macy. '8 2 Recently, this model has shifted. "A smaller proportion of the
population is living in the heterosexual nuclear family of idealized mid-
twentieth century form, and fewer people are choosing or able to construct
their relations of cathexis according to the symmetrical family, intimate
8,3couple model." More people are thus living outside of domestic coupling,
which necessarily changes their notions of intimate connection. Instead of
relying on family within the home, people are relying on friends outside of
the home.
For example, in her study of individuals in England who, as of 2000, did
not live with a sexual partner, sociologist Sasha Roseneil found "a high de-
gree of reliance on friends, as opposed to biological kin and sexual partners,
80. See, e.g., CLAUDE S. FISCHER, To DWELL AMONG FRIENDS: PERSONAL NETWORKS IN
TOWN AND CITY 102-15, 125-38 (1982).
81. Roseneil, supra note 75, at 409; see also MICHEL MAFFESOLI, THE TIME OF THE TRIBES:
THE DECLINE OF INDIVIDUALISM IN MASS SOCIETY (Don Smith trans., 1996); ETHAN WATTERS,
URBAN TRIBES: A GENERATION REDEFINES FRIENDSHIP, FAMILY, AND COMMITMENT 40-69, 184-95
(2003). Writing outside of sociology, Andrew Sullivan has made a similar connection between
friendship and the desire for autonomous living:
[F]riendship is for those who do not want to be saved, for those whose appreciation of life is
here and now and whose comfort in themselves is sufficient for them to want merely to share
rather than to lose their identity. And they enter into friendship as an act of radical choice.
Friendship, in this sense, is the performance art of freedom.
ANDREW SULLIVAN, LOVE UNDETECTABLE: NOTES ON FRIENDSHIP, SEX AND SURVIVAL 212 (1998).
82. Roseneil, supra note 75, at 411.
83. Id. at 412. However, social scientists, much like family law scholars, have been slow to
respond to this shift. Id. at 413 (concluding that the study's findings suggest "that social researchers
have often failed to see the eytent to which, often as a matter of preference, people are substituting




particularly for the provision of care and support in everyday life, and
friendship operated as key value and site of ethical practice for many.''8 In
contrast to perceptions that individuals are increasingly isolated and
"bowling alone,"85 this study reported that the participants "were enmeshed
in complex networks of intimacy and care, and had strong commitments and
connections to others. 86 Within these networks, the participants deempha-
sized the couple relationship, explicitly choosing to live separately from
their primary sexual partners and centering their lives instead around
friends. 87 The participants were therefore able to maintain adult connection
while simultaneously living alone or living only with their children.
Studies in the United States reveal similar trends. For example, sociolo-
gist Kay Trimberger interviewed forty women between the ages of thirty
and sixty who were living outside of marriage. Her interviews revealed that
the women primarily relied on large networks of friends, rather than family,
for both emotional and material support, including when faced with health
or financial emergencies." Other studies have found that single mothers 9
and older women 9° similarly rely on extended friendship networks. Indeed,
84. Id. at 413.
85. See generally ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF
AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000); Henry Fountain, The Lonely American Just Got a Bit Lonelier, N.Y
TIMES, July 2, 2006, at D12.
86. Roseneil, supra note 75, at 413.
87. Id. Another article summarizes the study as follows:
Our research found that friends give and receive care and support in a wide range of situations
of emotional, physical and practical need, and that traditional demarcations of domestic and
private space are reconfigured in the process. In a related process, sexual partnerships are de-
prioritized in a way which runs counter to dominant discourses about the overwhelming
importance of romantic love.
Shelly Budgeon & Sasha Roseneil, Editors' Introduction: Beyond the Conventional Family, 52
CURRENT SOC. 127, 129 (2004). For detailed discussions of some of the study's findings, see Sasha
Roseneil & Shelley Budgeon, Cultures of Intimacy and Care Beyond 'the Family': Personal Life
and Social Change in the Early 21st Century, 52 CURRENT SOC. 135, 152-54 (2004).
88. E. Kay Trimberger, Friendship Networks and Care 5 (Ctr. for Working Families, Univ. of
Cal., Berkeley, Working Paper No. 31, 2002), available at http://wfnetwork.bc.edu/berkeley/
papers/31.pdf; see also E. KAY TRIMBERGER, THE NEW SINGLE WOMAN (2005) (discussing the
results of a follow-up study of twenty-seven of the women).
89. See, e.g., Rosanna Hertz & Faith I. T. Ferguson, Kinship Strategies and Self-Sufficiency
Among Single Mothers by Choice: Post Modem Family lies, 20 QUALITATIVE Soc. 187, 204-06
(1997).
90. See, e.g., Christine L. Himes & Erin B. Reidy, The Role of Friends in Caregiving, 22
RES. ON AGING 315, 330-33 (2000); Margaret A. Perkinson & David D. Rockemann, Older Women
Living in a Continuing Care Retirement Community: Marital Status and Friendship Formation, 8 J.
WOMEN & AGING 159, 174-75 (1996); Jane Gross, Older Women Team Up to Face Future Together,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2004, at Al.
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studies of friendship among older adults "find that friendships are more im-
portant than family relations for morale and well-being in old age."9'
These studies, and others,9 address some of "the ways in which the
category of the family is increasingly failing to contain the multiplicity of
practices of intimacy and care which have traditionally been its prerogative
and its raison d'etre."93 Therefore, if family law scholars want family law to
reflect the reality of intimate life, and to allow diverse conceptions of inti-
macy to flourish, family law must begin to consider the role of friendship in
people's lives. In addition, family law scholars interested in promoting indi-
vidual agency and autonomy within the family can benefit from a
consideration of the ways that friendship is practiced. Much of the revolu-
tion in marriage law over the past decades can be traced back to the policy
decision to treat spouses as individuals rather than as a unit.94 However, by
confining this process of individualization to marriage, family law contrib-
utes to a societal emphasis on coupledom. Although spouses are individuals,
the law confers benefits to them solely because they are in a couple recog-
nized by the state; if they presented themselves "merely" as friends, they
would not be eligible for state recognition. The individuals in the couple are
therefore dependent on each other for the continuance of state benefits and
legal recognition.
This state-induced dependence is at odds with recent processes of indi-
vidualization,9 a conflict which has led to increased rejection of "the
romantic dyad and the modem family formation it has supported."96 This
does not mean, however, that people are living completely autonomous
lives. Rather, as discussed above, they are relying on networks of friends not
recognized by the state. As such, both attachment and autonomy are valued
simultaneously, divorcing care from dependency and domesticity in many
contexts.
91. Trimberger, supra note 88, at 6.
92. E.g., PETER WILLMOTT, FRIENDSHIP NETWORKS AND SOCIAL SUPPORT (1987); Graham
Allan, Friendship, Sociology and Social Structure, 15 J. Soc. & PERS. RELATIONSHIPS 685 (1998);
Sue Heath, Peer-Shared Households, Quasi-Communes and Neo-Tribes, 52 CURRENT Soc. 161
(2004); Ray Pahl, Friendship: the Social Glue of Contemporary Society?, in THE POLITICS OF RISK
SOCIETY 99 (Jane Franklin ed., 1998).
93. Budgeon & Roseneil, supra note 87, at 127.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 4-I5.
95. For discussions of this trend toward individualization, see ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, THE
INDIVIDUALIZED SOCIETY (2001); ULRICH BECK & ELISABETH BECK-GERNSHEIM, INDIVIDUALIZA-
TION: INSTITUITIONALIZED INDIVIDUALISM AND ITS SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES (2002).
96. Budgeon & Roseneil, supra note 87, at 127.
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C. The Role of Marriage and Domesticity
Given that friendship increasingly serves many of the functions tradi-
tionally reserved for family, friendship could easily fall within family law's
domain. Indeed, some sort of recognition of friendship could further family
law's goals of reflecting lived experience, fostering pluralism and promoting
autonomy and equality within the family.97 Instead of such recognition,
however, the state continues to play a large role in creating the divide be-
tween family and "mere" friendship.
Family law's silence about friendship necessarily implies that the state
views the attachment and care embodied in many friendships as sufficiently
different from that provided within the family to warrant no explicit legal
attention. Indeed, by refusing to view friendship as within its orbit of con-
cern, family law lumps friendship with all other "transactions" between
adults.9s Family law's silence is thus more than silence. It also labels friend-
ships as insufficiently intimate, thereby implicitly privileging relationships
other than friendship as the preferred form of attachment and connection.
This silence does more than potentially stigmatize friendship. Rather,
the silence can also perpetuate gender inequality, because the preferred form
of attachment and connection is marriage and, increasingly, relationships
that embrace many aspects of traditional marriage by providing care within
the home.99 Elevating such relationships over friendships contributes to gen-
der inequality by encouraging individuals to engage in domestic coupling
rooted in a history of patriarchy'00 and then stigmatizing those who live out-
side of that coupling.'0 '
1. The Gendered History of Marriage and the Home
Even as scholars attempt to find ways for the law to recognize diverse
relationships within the home, relationships outside of the home that do not
qualify for traditional familial status, either through legal marriage or par-
enthood, have been ignored. This focus on caregiving within the home, to
the exclusion of other forms of caregiving, such as friendship, likely per-
97. See supra text accompanying notes 78-79.
98. For a (most likely unconscious) example of this effect, see FINEMAN, supra note 32, at
228-30. For a similar critique of mainstream sociology, see Roseneil & Budgeon, supra note 87, at
137 ("Sociology continues to marginalize the study of love, intimacy, care and sociality beyond the
'family', even though it has expanded the scope covered by this term to include a wider range of
'families of choice.' ").
99. See supra text accompanying notes 32-49.
100. For additional discussion of this history, see OKIN, supra note 18, at 134-69.
101. See infra text accompanying notes 128-129.
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petuates gender inequality for two reasons related to the gendered history of
marriage.
First, as illustrated by Rachel Moran's recent summary of the history of
the single woman in the United States, middle-class white women tradition-
ally experienced extreme pressure to marry, given their economic and
political subordination and the widely held view that "[m]arital status de-
fined women's worth.' ' 2 This worth was intimately tied to women's care of
men within the home. Some of this care was sexual, as marriage was the
only legitimate site for sexual activity.' °3 However, most of the care was
nonsexual domestic care.' °4 Indeed, even before marrying, women were en-
couraged, and at times required,' 5 to attach themselves to a household so
that "regardless of marital status, they could live under the authority of a
male head of household, do productive work that would contribute to his
advancement, and rely on his representation in public meetings."'°
Second, as mentioned earlier, 0 7 once married, women were legally re-
quired to provide domestic care to their husbands and children, and they had
no right to ask their husbands to provide similar care in return. Instead, hus-
bands were legally required to provide financial support only, and that
support did not need to be commensurate to the levels of domestic care pro-
vided by their wives. The state neither recognized nor mandated any other
forms of caregiving or support between adults.
Over twenty-five years ago, Adrienne Rich relied on this history of mar-
riage to describe the various ways that "women have been convinced that
marriage, and sexual orientation toward men, are inevitable, even if unsatis-
fying or oppressive components of their lives." 0 8 Rich emphasized the
myriad social forces that pressured women into marriage:
102. Moran, supra note 32, at 229-30. For a brief discussion about the ways black and work-
ing class women were often denied access to marriage, see id. at 226-29.
103. Id. at 238 ("The colonies applied formal and informal pressure to keep sex and procrea-
tion within the confines of marriage."); see Stephen J. Pope, Sex, Marriage, and Family Life: The
Teachings of Nature, in FAMILY TRANSFORMED: RELIGION, VALUES, AND SOCIETY IN AMERICAN
LIFE 52, 65 (Steven M. Tipton & John Witte Jr. eds., 2005).
104. Moran, supra note 32, at 230-40.
105. Id. at 236 ("To preserve the social order, New England colonies banned 'solitary liv-
ing.'... Whether living at home or apprenticed to other households, single women performed
traditional domestic tasks, such as housekeeping, child care, and nursing of the sick and elderly.").
106. Id.
107. See supra text accompanying note 10 (briefly discussing the gendered nature of the legal
family prior to the 1970s).
108. Adrienne Rich, Compulsory Hetemsexuality and Lesbian Existence, 5 SIGNS 631, 640
(1980); see also id. at 643 ("[Women] turn to marriage as a form of hoped-for-protection, while




Women have married because it was necessary, in order to survive eco-
nomically, in order to have children who would not suffer economic
deprivation or social ostracism, in order to remain respectable, in order
to do what was expected of women because coming out of "abnormal"
childhoods they wanted to feel "normal," and because heterosexual
romance has been represented as the great female adventure, duty, and
fulfillment. 09
Because even the so-called "modem" marriages of the 1970s often rein-
scribed this gender hierarchy and replicated past gendered divisions of
care," 0 Rich called on women to place less priority on marriage so that they
could instead embrace more fully other forms of relationships along her
"lesbian continuum," including friendships." '
Many people, and maybe even most feminists, believe that much has
changed since the time of Rich's writing. First and foremost, the dignity of
lesbians and gay men has been partially affirmed by the U.S. Supreme
Court ' 2 and other institutions."' In addition, women's increased access to
education and employment has meant that economic survival outside of
marriage is less of an issue for many women." 4 Large cohorts of women
therefore have the means to delay marriage or long-term domestic commit-
ment until they find the partner of their choice. Marriage, once chosen, is
thus more likely to be viewed as satisfying for women.
Despite this belief, many gendered and heteronormative aspects of mar-
riage remain. Immense value is still given to romantic coupling, whether it
be opposite sex or same sex. Although many of the historically oppressive
aspects of marriage have been softened, or even eliminated, the privileging
109. Id. at 654.
110. See id. at 647-48. The power dynamics of such hierarchy can exist even in same-sex
relationships, particularly when scholars advocate that those relationships should be acknowledged
by the state because they embrace a domesticity similar to opposite-sex relationships. Same-sex
coupling can thus take on a specific meaning rooted in the history of female sacrifice and depend-
ency. See, e.g., Polikoff, supra note 34, at 1539-40.
111. Rich, supra note 108, at 648-49.
112. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
113. For example, eighteen states and the District of Columbia now prohibit employment
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOUNDATION, STATE
OF THE WORKPLACE FOR GAY, LESBIAN, BIXSEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER AMERICANS: 2005-2006, at
12 (2006), available at http://www.hrc.org/documents/SOTW20052006.pdf (listing seventeen states
with nondiscrimination laws as of 2006); Jason Clayworth, Rights bill protecting gays set for sign-
ing, DES MOINES REG., May 25, 2007, at lB ("Today, Iowa is expected to become the 18th state to
offer civil rights protection to gay and lesbian residents."). Even outside of these states, many large
private employers have voluntarily adopted policies that prohibit discrimination and harassment on
the basis of sexual orientation.
114. The Bush Administration, however, is spending millions of dollars to encourage poor
women to marry. Hamilton, supra note 33, at 309-10, 366-68; Sharon Lemer, The Bush Administra-
tion's Misguided Povery Cure: Marriage on the Mind, NATION, July 5, 2004, at 40.
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of conjugal, domestic coupling persists. Indeed, raising children is so tied to
married conjugality that it is often hard to imagine individuals outside of such
a relationship having or raising children together. Instead, mothers are labeled
as either partnered or single, even if those so-called single mothers have
friends and extended family members supporting them in their childrearing
duties." 5 Women today thus continue to be pressured to prioritize domestic-
ity and conjugality over other relationships that do not share a similar
history of gendered dependence and hierarchy." 6 And once in domestic rela-
tionships, women continue to perform most of the carework for the family.'7
This pressure does not emanate from a single source, nor is it necessar-
ily the result of bad, or good," 8 motivations. Rather, the messages in support
of coupling come from many sources, often unwittingly. Feminists, among
others, are not exempt. As Moran has pointed out, "the second-wave femi-
nist reform agenda often emphasized the importance of enabling women to
balance marriage, motherhood, and work, an approach that implied that
singlehood was a mere way station on the way to a committed relation-
ship."" 9 This focus remains today, as "liberal feminists often have presumed
that women will marry and have children, so that the central dilemma to be
addressed is how to reconcile work and family responsibilities.' 2 0 Legal
scholars, writing within family law and within other subject areas, have
similarly perpetuated norms of domestic coupling by focusing on the ways
the state can help women balance work and family.' 2' Despite claims that
115. See, e.g., Hertz & Ferguson, supra note 89, at 204-06.
116. See, e.g., Hillary Frey, Why Ms. Independent Still Wants to Get Hitched; The Rules of
Attraction, NATION, July 5, 2004, at 42.
117. See, e.g., ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD WITH ANNE MACHUNG, THE SECOND SHIFr
149-66 (2d ed. 2003).
118. For example, one study designed to determine what makes women happy during mar-
riage has concluded that married women are happier if they eschew gender equality and instead
embrace traditional expectations of marriage. See W. Bradford Wilcox & Steven L. Nock, What's
Love Got To Do With It? Equality, Equity, Commitment & Women's Marital Quality, 84 Soc. FORCES
1321, 1324-28 (2006).
119. Moran, supra note 32, at 226; see also id. at 261 ("In contrast to first-wave feminists
who ultimately embraced political individualism through the quest for universal suffrage, liberal
second-wave feminists made economic individualism the centerpiece of their reform efforts. Con-
temporary feminists insisted on improved access to education, equal rights in the workplace, and
comparable access to government benefits and private credit. At the same time, liberal reformers
presumed that women would marry and have children, forcing them to juggle a career and responsi-
bilities at home."); id. at 267-68 ("Organizations like NOW could not envision an agenda that would
explicitly enable women to pursue satisfying lives outside the confines of a traditional couple.").
120. Id. at 226; see also id. at 228 ("Despite the possibility that political and economic indi-
vidualism can transform women's emotional make-up and ethical values, feminists have been
reluctant to relinquish the advantage that women's unique role as the guardian of domestic life con-
fers.").
121. For some examples, see WILLIAMS, supra note 6, at 14-39; Mary Becker, Care and
Feminists, 17 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 57, 97-109 (2002); Tonya L. Brito, Spousal Support Takes on the
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this focus acknowledges the "care work" performed by women, these schol-
ars generally consider only a certain type of care: that provided within the
home to spouses (generally men) and children. 22
This focus on domestic coupling ignores the fact that many women give
and receive other types of care at multiple locations throughout their daily
lives. For example, Lucie White has explored how some of the mothers in
Head Start support one another, not just as parents, but also as friends. 2 1
Other scholars, including Patricia Hill Collins and Laura Kessler, have simi-
larly explored how "other mothering" in African American communities
involves much more than childcare and can create friendship networks with
"different purposes-for example, socialization, reproduction, consumption,
emotional support, economic cooperation, and sexuality."'' 24 The legal schol-
ars interested in state support of caregiving have largely ignored the care
provided through such relationships. This silence betrays not only a class
and race bias 1s but also a bias in favor of a certain type of care, namely do-
mestic care.
Family law's silence about friendship and other types of nondomestic
care similarly contributes to the pressure of coupledom that many women
experience. By providing recognition and support to the caregiving provided
within marriage but not to other forms of caregiving, existing family law
signals that the care provided through one comprehensive domestic relation-
ship is superior to the care provided by relationships that are not primarily
defined by their sexual or domestic nature. Alternative visions of the family
also signal that domestic care is superior to friendship given the prominence
126those visions give to caregiving within the home.
Mommy Track: Why the ALI Proposal is Good for Working Mothers, 8 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y
151, 153-56 (2001); Naomi Cahn, The Power of Caretaking, 12 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 177, 214-
223 (2000); Laura T. Kessler, The Attachment Gap: Employment Discrimination Law, Women's
Cultural Caregiving, and the Limits of Economic and Liberal Legal Theory, 34 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 371, 460-67 (2001); Deborah L. Rhode, Balanced Lives, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 834, 841-47
(2002); Vicki L. Schultz, Lfe's Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1928-63 (2000).
122. See, e.g., Martha T. McCluskey, Caring for Workers, 55 ME. L. REV. 313, 317-20, 326-
29 (2002).
123. Lucie E. White, Raced Histories, Mother Friendships, and the Power of Care: Conversa-
tions with Women in Project Head Start, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1569, 1575 (2001).
124. Laura T. Kessler, Transgressive Caregiving, 33 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 1, 19 (2005); see also
PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT: KNOWLEDGE, CONSCIOUSNESS, AND THE
POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT 178-83 (2d ed. 2000); CAROL B. STACK, ALL OUR KIN: STRATEGIES
FOR SURVIVAL IN A BLACK COMMUNITY (Basic Books 1997) (1974).
125. For a similar critique of feminism in general, see Moran, supra note 32, at 229 ("Insofar
as feminists equate female difference and moral superiority with women's domestic role, they have
a blind spot about women who live outside the boundaries of traditional home life, whether those
women identify themselves by race, sexual orientation, or unmarried status.").
126. See supra text accompanying notes 32-39, 48-49.
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Given these forces, Rich's call for women to explore multiple relation-
ships other than marriage still resonates today. Embracing friendship, either
in addition to or instead of coupling and other forms of domestic relation-
ships, can open up opportunities to explore what it would mean to resist the
presumed superiority of domesticity. Increased opportunities to experience
freedom from gender role expectations may result."' If family law is com-
mitted to gender equality, it must consider how legal recognition of
friendship could enhance the ability of women to experience more robust
notions of agency and equality in everyday life.
2. Maintaining the Divide Between Marriage and Friendship
Family law's privileging of marriage and domesticity over friendship has
consequences beyond the encouragement of domestic coupling. It can also
lead to feelings of stigmatization and even loneliness and fear, particularly
among some who exist outside of marriage by circumstance rather than
choice. Such loneliness has recently led Drucilla Cornell to urge feminists
"to find alternative ways of being together outside of the structure of private
houses ordered by heterosexual coupling."'
29
Feelings of stigmatization result from the maintenance of a clear line be-
tween marriage and friendship, so that friendship cannot take the place of
marriage and domesticity. This line is constructed in part by family law's
focus on caregiving within the home,"3 but more is necessary to draw an
accurate distinction between the law's constructions of marriage and friend-
ship. One feminist family law scholar emphasizes that "[c]ompanionship is
the core good of marriage, not procreation or sex."'' Pursuant to this ideal,
friendship and marriage are more alike than different. Marriage must there-
fore provide companionship in a particular form in order to justify the
state's stark distinction between friendship and marriage. 3 2 Cohabitating
127. Cf, FRIEDMAN, supra note 58, at 248-49 ("Friendship among women has been the ce-
ment not only of the various historical waves of the feminist movement but also of numerous
communities of women throughout history who defied the local conventions for their gender and
lived lives of creative disorder."); Nancy J. Hirschmann, Toward a Feminist Theory of Freedom, 24
POL. THEORY 46, 59-62 (1996) (exploring how female friendship can help women explore gendered
constraints on agency).
128. See, e.g., Trimberger, supra note 88, at 13 ("By assimilating all unpaid care into family,
we reinforce the continued invisibility of care provided by friendship networks and contribute to the
insecurity felt by those with weak family ties.").
129. Drucilla L. Conell, The Solace of Resonance, 20 HYPATIA, Spring 2005, at 215, 218.
130. See supra Section I.C.
131. Mary Becker, Family Law in the Secular State and Restrictions on Same-Sex Marriage:
TwoAre Better Than One, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 31 (2001).
132. Cf Budgeon & Roseneil, supra note 87, at 129 (describing the "expectations within the
heterosexual relationship order" as including "co-residence, romantic love, monogamy and the
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companionship could be the defining aspect of marriage, but that too does
not adequately distinguish marriage from friendship, or else roommates
would be the equivalent of spouses. Sex could be the decisive additional
aspect, but that also proves inadequate because friends may have sex with
one another (whether they refer to themselves as friends with benefits or
not) and large numbers of married people have sex with people who are not
their spouses 113 (and who may, presumably, be their friends in some cases).
The difference between marriage and friendship instead appears to re-
volve around the powerful notions of stability and comprehensiveness that
marriage evokes.' Once marriage is chosen, people assume the relationship
will persevere even through difficult times. 35 Exit, although increasingly
exercised, is seen as an onerous endeavor. Indeed, some spouses feel stuck
in their marriages, and other spouses want their partners to feel that way in
order to reinforce the stability of the relationship. This experience of stabil-
ity, whether it is viewed as desirable or oppressive, often leads to the
expectation that marriage will be a comprehensive relationship, meeting all
needs for intimacy and care. Anything less than comprehensiveness could
threaten the stability of the relationship, and spouses often expect robust
returns on their decision to stick things out.
Of course, neither stability nor comprehensiveness is an innate part of
marriage. Rather, both aspects of marriage are created by state support.1
36
Stability may not be a core good of marriage but for the state regulation of
entrance and exit. Similarly, it would be difficult for marriage to be a com-
prehensive relationship but for the state's decision to bestow a whole range
of benefits, obligations, and protections to married couples.
This work of the state creates the distinction between friendship and
marriage. It's not just that friendship is outside of the law: it's also that the
state creates marriage to be like no other relationship. Therefore, although
primacy of the conjugal couple"). Another way to view this domesticity is to see it as the opposite of
the "transgressive caregiving" identified by Laura Kessler. See Kessler, supra note 124, at 2-5.
133. Studies of adultery are often unreliable, given spouses' reluctance to self-report non-
monogamy. Even in the face of such reluctance, however, studies estimate that between fifteen and
eighteen percent of spouses engaged in sex with other partners while married. TOM W. SMITH,
AMERICAN SEXUAL BEHAVIOR: TRENDS, SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES, AND RISK BEHAVIOR 8-9
(2006), available at http://www.norc.org/NR/rdonlyres/2663F09F-2E74-436E-AC81-6FFBF288E183/
0/AmericanSexualBehavior2006.pdf (last visited July 10, 2007).
134. See, e.g., Developments in the Law-The Constitution and the Family, supra note 55;
Maxine Eichner, Marriage and the Elephant: The Liberal Democratic State's Regulation of Intimate
Relationships Between Adults, 30 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 25, 49-55 (2007).
135. See, e.g., Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual
Privacy-Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV. 463, 476-84 (1983)
(emphasizing that the commitment of marriage increases the likelihood that couples will work
through difficult times instead of exiting).
136. Cf Sanger, supra note 49, at 1317 ("Civil marriage bestows status and respect precisely
because it is created by law.").
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friends may serve many of the functions of spouses, and may at times do so
in a way that better achieves at least some of the goals of family law,'37
friendships pale in comparison to marriage. This comparison leads some
people existing outside of marriage to feel stigmatized and alone, even if
they have friends in their lives. Similarly, it encourages some people to pri-
oritize dating that could lead to marriage over other forms of relationship.
In addition to minimizing friendship, the glorification of marriage as the
ultimate relationship masks problems with marriage, most importantly the
fact that marriage law in the United States was created to solidify men's
position as the head of their households. Historically, marriage had to be the
ultimate relationship because women lost their legal identity upon marriage
and had to rely on their husband's financial and political support."8 Wives in
turn provided the domestic support that made that participation in the mar-
ket and political realm possible.'
Although marriage law has undergone a radical transformation since that
time, marriage law has been irreparably shaped by this history. Indeed,
given its roots, the law of marriage may be more about gender than about
intimate relationship or companionship.14 Given this history, as well as
other social and legal forces that continue to construct gender by delineating
narrow gender roles, 4 it is unsurprising that the care provided within many
marriages is still gendered, with wives more often than husbands sacrificing
their individual desires for the good of the unit.
42
In all of these ways, the practice of marriage, as shaped by the state,
plays a vital role in maintaining gender inequality. By privileging marital
and domestic care over the care provided by friends, family law, too, contin-
ues to play a role in the maintenance of gender inequality. Bringing
friendship into the scope of family law could disrupt this pattern, potentially
(and paradoxically?) leading to more freedom than that derived from friend-
ship's placement outside of the law.
137. See supra Section l.B.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 102-106.
139. See supra text accompanying notes 10, 107.
140. See COTT, supra note 4, at 3 (describing how state laws concerning marriage "can shape
the gender order"); Herma Hill Kay, "Making Marriage and Divorce Safe for Women" Revisited, 32
HOFSTRA L. REV. 71, 89-91 (2003) (arguing that the law of marriage is "a codification of a society's
attitudes about women").
141. See, e.g., Mary Joe Frug, Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto (An Unfinished Draft),
105 HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1055-65 (1992).
142. See, e.g., Anita Bernstein, For and Against Marriage: A Revision, 102 MICH. L. REV.
129, 178-80 (2003); McCluskey, supra note 122, at 331-32.
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III. THE POTENTIAL OF NEW CONSTRUCTIONS
Family law has sustained marriage as the ultimate personal relationship
by maintaining strict divisions, not only between marriage and other sexual
relationships, but also between marriage and friendship. As set forth in the
previous Part, this division between marriage and friendship contributes to
the social pressure to marry by positing friendship as insufficiently like mar-
riage to take its place. Once people marry, the division also places pressure
on the marital relationship itself by constructing marriage as the site for all
caregiving functions, even functions that can be, and are, performed by
friends.
Recent reform proposals within family law have failed to challenge this
division between marriage and friendship. Instead, those proposals hinge on
the presence of marriage-like domesticity within the home, 4 1 thereby rein-
forcing the view that the type of care traditionally provided within marriage
is both distinct from the care provided by friends and more worthy of state
support. Family law thus continues to affect experiences of friendship, but
family law scholars and reformers have failed to consider friendship explic-
itly. That silence reveals just how rigid some of the boundaries of family law
have become. Such rigidity is not required, given that family law is a con-
struction,'" and the existing construction already indirectly influences
friendship. 45 Moreover, rigid boundaries are undesirable if they thwart the
achievement of the stated goals of family law, including the promotion of
gender equality within the family and without.
This Part examines how explicit consideration of the role of friendship
in people's lives could help family law better achieve its goals, in large part
by modifying some of the signals sent by the current construction of family
law. The first Section discusses the two most obvious ways that the law
could begin to recognize friendship: either by treating friends as family or
by treating family as friends. Although these approaches have considerable
strengths, they both risk reinforcing the line between friends and family in-
stead of challenging it. The second Section therefore goes beyond the two
approaches to examine how family law could begin to blur the legal binary
between friends and family by recognizing the various ways that the func-
tions performed by the relationships are often fluid and overlapping.
Although a comprehensive scheme for law reform is premature, the Section
sets forth two principles that should guide family law's simultaneous recog-
nition of family and friendship and provides some examples of how that
recognition could be achieved. The last Section theorizes how such recogni-
143. See supra text accompanying notes 34-52.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 1-3.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 56-76.
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tion of friendship could help family law further its goal of achieving gender
equality within the family and without. The goal would be furthered not
because gender is irrelevant to friendship- in fact friendship, like marriage,
is deeply gendered at this time 46--but because a simultaneous recognition
of friendship and family may create more opportunities for both women and
men to engage in relationships free from gender-role expectations. In the
process, relationships between women, between men, and between women
and men could be transformed.
A. Changing the Content of Family or Friendship
What would it mean to construct the boundaries of family law so that
they include friendship? One obvious approach would be to call for more
recognition of friendship as family. Conversely, one could call for less legal
recognition of family, treating coupling between adults more like friendship.
Both approaches would change the content of legal conceptions of family
and friendship, thereby potentially lending more support to the diverse ways
that individuals might structure their personal relationships. However, be-
cause both approaches rely on the maintenance of a firm line between
family and friendship, they are unlikely to disrupt the privileging of domes-
tic caregiving at the core of current constructions of family law.
1. Friends as Family
The most obvious way for the state to begin to recognize friendship is to
provide friends with state recognition and benefits if their relationships suf-
ficiently mirror traditional definitions of family. This approach, derived
from functional approaches to marriage and family,147 has already been em-
braced in both Canada and France. France has created the legal status of
Pacte Civil de Solidarite ("PACS"), available to any two people who share a
home and wish to provide each other with mutual assistance and support.
Similarly, Canada has adopted the reforms proposed in a report entitled Be-
yond Conjugality, extending domestic partnership benefits to any two
people in a relationship of "economic interdependence," regardless of
146. See infra Section III.C.
147. See supra note 78 (citing sources arguing that state recognition of family should hinge on
the performance of family functions instead of the attainment of legal status).
148. See, e.g., CARL F. STYCHIN, GOVERNING SEXUALITY: THE CHANGING POLITICS OF CITI-
ZENSHIP AND LAw REFORM 50-57 (2003); Daniel Borrillo, Who Is Breaking With Tradition? The
Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Partnership in France and the Question of Modernity, 17 YALE J.L.
& FEMINISM 89, 91 (2005).
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conjugality.' 49 Under these approaches, friends can literally become friends
with benefits, but in contrast to the colloquial term, sex need not always be
involved.)5 Instead, cohabitation and the sharing of financial resources dis-
tinguish the friendships recognized by the state from those that exist outside
of the law's domain.
Such a functional approach would broaden the law's reach, but it is
unlikely to disrupt the privileging of marriage and domesticity. Instead,
friendships are recognized by the law only to the extent they mirror, at least
in respects deemed important by the state, the traditional nuclear family.'5'
Sex is expendable, but other aspects of domesticity are required. Therefore,
the way of life known as marriage is largely affirmed, not challenged.1 2 Of
course, domesticity divorced from sex could change some aspects of the
domestic life that is embodied by marriage, but it also could not.'53 Most
saliently, domestic interdependence is still privileged over more autonomous
relationships, including relationships outside the home.
Moreover, because these approaches require individuals to specify one
primary, comprehensive relationship in their lives, they fail to challenge the
privilege of coupling. Under both approaches, individuals may seek state
recognition only if they are not married or in a marriage-like relationship
54
These friends-as-family approaches thus encourage individuals to focus
time and energy on one interdependent relationship rather than pursuing a
149. LAW COMMISSION OF CANADA, BEYOND CONJUGALITY: RECOGNIZING AND SUPPORTING
CLOSE PERSONAL ADULT RELATIONSHIPS (2001). For a thorough discussion of the approach, see
Nancy D. Polikoff, Ending Marriage As We Know It, 32 HoFSTRA L. REV. 201 (2003).
150. In Canada, conjugality is explicitly not a requirement. In France, it is unclear whether a
known nonconjugal relationship could be eligible for PACS recognition. Compare Borillo, supra
note 148, at 91 (emphasizing that the PACS contract is not available for a partnership with "your
parent, grandparent, child, grandchild, parent-in-law, brother, sister, uncle, aunt, nephew or niece"),
with Marie A. Failinger, A Peace Proposal for the Same-Sex Marriage Wars: Restoring the House-
hold to its Proper Place, 10 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 195, 208 (2004) ("[PACS] permits any
two unmarried adults to enter into a legal relationship regardless of gender or perhaps even without
a sexual relationship... ").
151. For a more developed critique of functional approaches to the family along these lines,
see Hamilton, supra note 33. For a partial defense of these approaches, see Brenda Cossman, Con-
testing Conservatisms, Family Feuds and the Privatization of Dependency, 13 AM. U.J. GENDER
SOC. POL'Y & L. 415, 507 (2005) (discussing the "unique nature of the economic and emotional
dependency that characterizes" marriage and other domestic relationships).
152. See BUTLER, supra note 41, at 26 (arguing that "it is crucial to expand our notions of
kinship beyond the heterosexual frame" and that "[it would be a mistake ... to reduce kinship to
family, or to assume that all sustaining community and friendship ties are extrapolations of kin
relations").
153. Indeed, a recent New Yorker cartoon suggests that marriage is defined, in large part, by
the lack of sex within domesticity. An older woman wraps her arms around a younger, opposite-sex
couple and states: "You fight, you don't have sex-isn't it time you two tied the knot?" C.A.J., NEW
YORKER, June 19, 2006, at 36.
154. See Borrillo, supra note 148, at 91; Polikoff, supra note 149, at 221 & n.l 16.
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range of intimate relationships with multiple friends. Friendships may re-
place family, but the state's role in privileging stable coupling remains in
full force.
A similar primacy requirement is found in David Chambers's proposal
of a new legal status called "designated friends," which he believes should
be available to all nonmarried adults, particularly after states provide same-
sex couples with the option of marrying."' Under this approach, friends
would be available for some state recognition even if their relationships do
not mirror traditional definitions of family. In particular, the new status
would not require conjugality or cohabitation, nor would it require a rejec-
tion of conjugality or cohabitation.- 6 However, like the Canadian and
French approaches, this new legal status would not be available to individu-
als who have already entered into marriage. In addition, Chambers's
proposal permits unmarried individuals to have only one "designated
friend." Stable coupling is therefore privileged in Chambers's proposal
much like it is in the French and Canadian approaches.
Unlike the French and Canadian approaches, however, Chambers sup-
ports a clear hierarchy between marriage and his proposed status:
[D]esignated friends[, unlike spouses,] would have no financial obligations
to each other, or derivatively, to others-no obligations to third parties re-
garding the other's debts, even for necessaries; no automatic
disqualification for medical or other welfare benefits because of the in-
come or resources of the other; no obligation to divide financial assets
between them if the relationship ends.
57
The status of designated friends could therefore be described as a "mar-
riage-lite" approach."8 Although this approach is designed to permit more
autonomy and independence within the relationship,5 9 the primacy require-
ment limits much of that autonomy. The status of "designated friends"
would therefore reinforce much of the existing privileging of marriage and
marriage-like relationships.
155. David L. Chambers, For the Best of Friends and for Lovers of All Sorts, A Status Other
than Marriage, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1347, 1348-49 (2001).
156. See id. at 1352 (making the status "available to any unmarried pair with a close relation-
ship"); see also id. at 1357 ("[O]ne reason for lumping the unmarried lovers with the divorced or
widowed sisters is to make clear that becoming designated friends has nothing necessarily to do
with sex, romance, or babymaking.").
157. Id. at 1353.
158. J. Thomas Oldham has used this term in a similar way, but not to describe Chambers's
proposal. See J. Thomas Oldham, Lessons from Jerry Hall v. Mick Jagger Regarding U.S. Regulation
of Heterosexual Cohabitants or, Can't Get No Satisfaction, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1409, 1430-33
(2001).
159. See Chambers, supra note 155, at 1357 ("[Tihey appreciate their own economic inde-
pendence and do not want to assume financial responsibility for the other.").
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In the end, each of these friends-as-family approaches similarly main-
tains a hierarchy between family and friends by recognizing friendship only
when it functions like a family. Legal notions of family are thus expanded,
but the construction of family law remains the same: family is in and friend-
ship is out. The line between family and friend may move, but the line is
then reinforced by the inclusion of a small subset of friendships and the
exclusion of all others. Family law thereby continues to signal that domestic
relationships are the only relationships worthy of state recognition and sup-
port, ignoring friendships outside of the home and, in doing so, likely
perpetuating gendered patterns of domestic care.
2. Family as Friends
Instead of extending benefits to friends, family law could narrow the
concept of family supported by the state. In contrast to treating friendship
like family, family law could instead treat certain family relationships like
friendship. Specifically, neither marriage nor marriage-like relationships
would be entitled to state support, just like friendships are not entitled to
state support. All adult personal relationships would exist outside of the law.
Family law scholars have already made similar proposals, but not in re-
sponse to an acknowledgment of friendship. Martha Fineman and Vivian
Hamilton have both proposed that the states stop allocating benefits to
adults in marriage and marriage-like relationships, because such relation-
ships are rarely a good proxy for the states' interest in supporting the private
care provided to dependents.' 6° Fineman in particular argues that the state
should instead support such caregiving directly, by providing benefits only
to "family units that are caring for children, the elderly, or the ill.,' 61 Other
scholars have similarly proposed that the state get out of the marriage busi-
ness, but they have done so for more strategic reasons, namely to avoid
debates about the legitimacy of same-sex marriage.1
62
These approaches are important because they explicitly recognize the
state's interest in privatizing dependency and emphasize that marriage,
standing alone, no longer necessarily involves dependency, or at least the
type of dependency that should be facilitated by the state. This acknowl-
edgment could help family law achieve its goal of gender equality in at least
160. See supra text accompanying notes 32-33.
161. Fineman, supra note 10, at 4; see also FINEMAN, supra note 32, at 230-36 (recommend-
ing that the state support childrearing by focusing on caregivers themselves); Martha Albertson
Fineman, The Meaning of Marriage, in MARRIAGE PROPOSALS: QUESTIONING A LEGAL STATUS 29,
43-57 (Anita Bernstein ed., 2006) (recommending similar state support of caregiving).
162. E.g., Daniel A. Crane, A "Judeo-Christian" Argument for Privatizing Marriage, 27
CARDOZO L. REV. 1221, 1222 (2006); Edward A. Zelinsky, Deregulating Marriage: The Pro-
Marriage Case for Abolishing Civil Marriage, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1161, 1164 (2006).
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two ways. First, the state definition of marriage would no longer hinge on
dependency, thereby creating a greater possibility that spouses could create
relationships that escape the patriarchal history of marriage. Second, the
state would no longer differentiate between marriage and friendship, thereby
reducing some of the incentives for individuals to prioritize marriage over
friendship.
This assessment of the potential benefits of these family-as-friends ap-
proaches relies on the insights of queer theory. Queer theorists have
emphasized that blurring the line between friends and family could promote
individual liberty by better enabling individuals to structure their lives free
from state-supported heteronormativity, including the very categories of
homosexuality and heterosexuality. 63 If private ordering is thought to free
individuals from restrictive sexual norms, then private ordering could also
be employed to free individuals from restrictive gender norms, including
gendered notions of who should engage in domestic care work.
This focus on individual freedom exposes a flaw inherent in family-as-
friends approaches, however, namely that the approaches are unlikely to
greatly disrupt the gendered notions of care and domesticity that have his-
torically defined marriage. These approaches separate dependency from
marriage, but they do little to challenge the historical assignment of depend-
ent caregiving to women as opposed to men. Family-as-friends approaches
may therefore continue to place dependent caregiving within women's do-
main, whether in the context of marriage or not.
For example, under Fineman's approach, although the state would no
longer recognize marriage, it would recognize and support dependent care-
giving.T64 This dependent caregiving would be prioritized over other forms
of caregiving, which would be left to the realm of private ordering. 6' Al-
though dependent caregiving is particularly worthy of state support,166 that
support does nothing to challenge, and in fact could reinforce, cultural
norms that assume women should engage in such caregiving. Legal recogni-
tion of dependent caregiving to the exclusion of other forms of caregiving
could therefore encourage women to prioritize dependent caregiving over
163. For examples of this argument, see BUTLER, supra note 41, at 109, and Carl F. Stychin,
"Las Vegas is not where we are ": Queer readings of the Civil Partnership Act, 25 POL. GEOGRAPHY
899, 917 (2006). For examples of the general emphasis on individual freedom in queer theory, in-
cluding freedom from identity categories, see LEO BERSANI, HoMos 3-4, 113-81 (1996), Janet
Halley, Sexuality Harassment in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 80 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley
eds., 2002), and supra text accompanying notes 40-46.
164. See supra text accompanying note 161 (emphasizing that under Fineman's approach, the
state would continue to provide benefits to "family units that are caring for children, the elderly, or
the ill," all of which involve dependent caregiving).
165. FINEMAN, supra note 32, at 226-36.




other caregiving, including the emotional care that is at the heart of many
friendships. Women would therefore continue to engage in more carework
than men do and to give more care than they receive.
In addition, a regime of private ordering between adults risks reinforcing
forms of private power that are rooted in a history of patriarchy. Although
the state would leave both marriage and friendship alone under these
approaches, that equal treatment would not necessarily change ingrained
patterns. Societal norms supportive of the sexual family may be sufficiently
strong that individuals would continue to order their lives around the form
of domestic caregiving embodied in marriage even if the state no longer
endorses that domesticity. Private ordering might even strengthen these so-
cietal norms, because family law would no longer signal its commitment to
gender equality within marriage. 67 The state's exit from marriage and mar-
riage-like relationships would not automatically posit friendship as a viable
alternative, or addition, to domesticity. Rather, the status quo could be fro-
zen in place, reducing the likelihood that more robust opportunities for
gender equality would result.
B. Recognizing Pluralistic Personal Relationships
and Conceptions of Care
Although potentially useful as an interim strategy, changing the legal
content of either family or friendship will likely not do enough to alter the
incentives that push women to prioritize domestic relationships over other
relationships. Instead, such approaches risk reinforcing the line between
friends and family, thereby strengthening the existing hierarchies of care
instead of challenging them. In order to alleviate these risks, family law
scholars must move beyond the construction of the family in order to exam-
ine the construction of family law as a whole.
1. The Power of Recognition
A focus on the construction of family law, as opposed to the construc-
tion of family, highlights the ways that the state supports certain aspects of
personal life over others. As discussed earlier, state support was initially tied
to women's economic and political dependency on men and the state's de-
sire to privatize that dependence so that women and children would not seek
direct financial support from the state. '6 Now that such dependency is no
167. Sanger, supra note 49, at 1319-22; cf Martha M. Ertman, Contractual Purgatory for
Sexual Minorities: Not Heaven, But Not Hell Either, 73 DENY. U. L. REV. 1107, 1119-20 (1996)
(illustrating how women, upon divorce, tend to fare better under default property rules than under
prenuptial agreements).
168. See supra text accompanying notes 4-5.
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longer legally mandated, family law scholars generally justify state support
of, and intervention in, private life by invoking three overlapping principles.
As discussed earlier, family law scholars hope that family law helps people
live the lives they are already living,"69 permits individuals to develop con-
ceptions of life free from undue state indoctrination, "° and provides
individuals with the tools to overcome the potential inequalities of the pri-
vate sphere, including gender inequality."'
These principles intersect to create a theoretical tension, existing
throughout family law, about whether the law should reflect or shape family
life. Most scholars considered to be within the mainstream of the field have
come to agree that the law should adapt to changing family life, and family
law reform has largely followed that course. 72 This approach contrasts with
those family law scholars who believe the law should channel individuals
into certain, superior ways of life, particularly marriage and childrearing
within wedlock."' This debate, however, generally obscures the fact that any
legal recognition of family-even recognition that reflects the ways that
most people live their lives-privileges that way of life over other ways of
life. Therefore, the law can never simply reflect family life but is also al-
ways shaping it.
74
The previous Part emphasized that this dynamic shapes not just family
life but friendship as well.77 Friendship is thus already implicitly regulated
by the state. Family law scholars have not acknowledged this regulation be-
cause they have focused solely on the construction of the family. Even the
169. See supra note 78.
170. See supra note 79.
171. E.g., MCCLAIN, supra note 13, at 5-6, 73-79, 134-54; see also supra text accompanying
notes I 1-15 (describing reforms designed to foster gender equality within the family).
172. See, e.g., Polikoff, supra note 39, at 362 ("[F]amily law has a history of adapting to
changing families, most notably in the recognition currently provided to children born out of wed-
lock .... ").
173. Carl E. Schneider, The Channeling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 495,
506-07 (1992). See, e.g., MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY
(1993); Margaret F Brinig, Domestic Partnership: Missing the Target, 4 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 19, 24-
25 (2002); Lynne Marie Kohm, How Will the Proliferation and Recognition of Domestic Partner-
ships Affect Marriage?, 4 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 105, 107-10 (2002); Elizabeth S. Scott, Marriage,
Cohabitation and Collective Responsibility for Dependency, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 225, 252; Lynn
D. Wardle, Deconstructing Family: A Critique of the American Law hIstitute's "Domestic Partners"
Proposal, 2001 BYU L. REV. 1189, 1222-23; Lynn D. Wardle, Is Marriage Obsolete?, 10 MICH. J.
GENDER & L. 189, 214-19 (2003). Two of these scholars, Milton Regan and Elizabeth Scott, sup-
port same-sex marriage, whereas the others do not. All of the scholars are united in their belief that
marriage is superior to other forms of adult intimate relationships.
174. This phenomenon is often referred to as the expressive power of family law. E.g.,
Elizabeth S. Scott, Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of Marriage, 86 VA. L. REV. 1901, 1926
(2000).
175. See supra text accompanying notes 62-72.
November 20071]
Michigan Law Review
friends-as-family and family-as-friends approaches discussed above rely on
the simple expansion or contraction of the legal family. 7 6 Each approach
leaves friendship unrecognized-but regulated nevertheless.
By moving beyond the construction of the family to the construction of
family law, family law scholars could begin to consider explicitly how the
existing boundaries of family law affect personal relationships both in and
beyond the legal family. The boundaries of the legal family would remain
significant to this consideration because they are currently constitutive of
both family and friendship. Once that work of family law is acknowledged,
however, family law scholars would not be confined to considerations of the
boundaries of the family. Rather, scholars could consider how family law
might explicitly recognize friendship, at least in some contexts.
Explicit legal recognition of friendship could soften the effects of the
state's current, implicit regulation of friendship by signaling that friendship
is worthy of state support. Such signaling might eliminate some of the
stigma experienced by people living outside of state-sanctioned coupling,
because other personal relationships would be recognized by the state. In
addition, such signaling would begin to blur the legal binary between friends
and family. That blurring could in turn disrupt the hierarchy of care pro-
duced by the current construction of family law, creating greater
possibilities for gender equality.
Although legal recognition of friendship has the potential to disrupt ex-
isting hierarchies of care produced by the current regulation of both
friendship and family, legal recognition of friendship also carries the risk of
reinscribing new hierarchies of care. Like any form of legal recognition,
recognition of friendship would signal that certain forms of care are more
worthy of state support than others."' Such signaling could frustrate family
law's goal of gender equality if legal recognition of friendship was substi-
tuted for legal recognition of family. Although friendship does not share
marriage's history of gendered dependence and hierarchy, it is still deeply
gendered, as described below.' Therefore, simply substituting friendship
for family is unlikely to produce greater freedom from gender role expecta-
tions.
A simultaneous recognition of friends and family could address this risk
while also emphasizing the overlapping nature of friendship and family.
Such simultaneous recognition would go beyond the binary of friends and
family to support individuals' choices about how to structure their lives,
choices mediated less by legal definitions of family than is currently permit-
176. See supra Section II.A.
177. Cf BUTLER, supra note 41, at 55 ("[Rlegulation is thus bound up with the process of
normalization.").
178. See infra Section IH.C.
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ted. This new construction of family law would not ask individuals to substi-
tute family for friendship or friendship for family. Rather, it would focus on
the care provided and received by multiple individuals throughout one's life
course. Instead of channeling personal relationships into recognized
forms, 179 the state would provide individuals with more freedom to embrace
diverse personal relationships and conceptions of care.
2. Guiding Principles
The specific contours of any new construction of family law will likely
be subject to much debate. This Article leaves proposals for law reform to
other scholars. Instead, my primary goal has been to illustrate the various
ways our imaginations have been limited by the current construction of fam-
ily law. That construction limits our ability to envision legal recognition of
networks of care outside of the home, thereby also limiting our ability to
conceive of more substantive forms of gender equality. Once the extent of
these limitations has been recognized, scholars can begin to explore com-
prehensive reforms that are not so limited.
However, the analysis above does suggest some guiding principles for
family law reformers. Most obviously, this Article calls for explicit state
recognition of friendship, and that recognition must go beyond a simple
proclamation that friendship is important to many people's lives. Instead,
state recognition of friendship must be sufficiently robust to match, or
counter, the signals currently sent by state recognition of marriage and fam-
ily. But that does not mean that the state must necessarily extend friends the
same benefits accorded to families. Instead of embracing simple norms of
equality, new constructions of family law can better recognize friendship by
embracing the principles of nonexclusivity and fluidity.
Nonexclusivity is vital to new constructions of family law because ex-
clusivity risks reinforcing the primacy of one comprehensive relationship
over others and the corresponding importance of domestic caregiving over
other forms of care. Such reinforcement would likely continue to channel
women into domestic caregiving roles. Simultaneous recognition of family
and friendship would go a long way toward combating that channeling. In-
deed, simultaneous recognition, by its very definition, is incompatible with
the current emphasis on exclusivity found in legal marriage.
179. Indeed, the forms of relationship recognized by this new construction of family law may
not look like marriage, family, or even friendship. Such difference does not place these relationships
outside family law's concern, however. As Sasha Roseneil reminds us, "[a] lesson of queer theory is
that we should resist the tendency to trivialize, infantilize and subordinate relationships which are
not clear parallels of the conventional, stable, long-term, cohabitating heterosexual couple." Rose-
neil, supra note 75, at 411.
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For example, one way to begin to think about new constructions of fam-
ily law would be to consider what would happen if the law made it relatively
easy for individuals to legally designate both a spouse and a "best friend."'8
This approach would still permit individuals to prioritize domestic coupling,
and, given the popularity of marriage, many individuals may continue to do
so, eschewing a legal best friend and embracing only a spouse. However,
others might choose both to marry and to maintain connection apart from
the marriage through the support of a best friend. The option of having a
state-recognized best friend in addition to or instead of a spouse would send
the message that close personal relationships come in diverse forms and that
individuals care for multiple people in multiple ways, even when married.
The state would not assume that individuals want to, or should, prioritize
domestic relationships over other forms of friendship or, conversely, that
individuals want to privilege friendship over marriage.
However, dual recognition is not enough, by itself, to eliminate the sig-
nal that individuals should privilege certain relationships over others.
Recognizing a legal best friend is not the same as recognizing friendship.
Why should individuals be forced to choose one friend over others for pur-
poses of legal recognition? Multiple friends can perform multiple functions
in different contexts. These functions are currently ignored within family
law, and a legal best friend proposal would likely ignore them as well, privi-
leging exclusivity in the realm of friendship as in the realm of marriage.
New constructions of family law would be more promising if they consid-
ered ways to more fully reject exclusivity. In thinking about such possibilities,
it may be useful to examine how nonexclusivity relates to the principle of flu-
idity that is also embodied in simultaneous recognition of friendship and
family. Fluidity challenges the notion that the functions of family so far rec-
ognized by family law are performed only within the legal family. Rather, the
functions are not confined to the legal family or to the home, nor need they be.
Instead, they can be performed by multiple people both within and without the
legal family, and, in addition to this multiplicity, the functions can shift from
one person to another, from inside the family to out.
In order to recognize that people can and do rely on multiple people to
perform different functions in their lives, and that these people and functions
can shift over time, family law would have to go well beyond proposals
permitting individuals to name one designated friend or even a spouse plus a
best friend. For example, one relatively aggressive approach would gather
all of the benefits, default rules, and obligations attaching to marriage'' and
180. This approach is therefore different from Chambers's proposal because individuals
would not have to choose between marriage and other legal statuses like designated friends. For
discussions of Chambers's proposal, see supra text accompanying notes 155-159.
181. For discussions of this "bundle," see Bernstein, supra note 142, at 146-52; James Herbie
DiFonzo, Unbundling Marriage, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 31, 52-57 (2003).
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permit individuals to assign some or all of those forms of legal support to
the individuals of their choice.' For example, an individual could choose
for default property division rules to apply to the person with whom they are
living, joint health insurance benefits to be shared with a noncohabitating
friend or lover, hospital visitation rights to be given to yet another person,
and protections under the FMLA to be available to care for a sibling.
Such an approach would be difficult to implement, given the complexity
of the current regulatory regime of marriage. The benefits, default rules, and
obligations attaching to marriage are a patchwork of federal, state, and local
law. 83 However, despite the fragmented nature of marriage recognition and
regulation, all levels of government are united in their silence with respect to
friendship. Permitting individuals to assign certain benefits, obligations, or
default rules to friends would therefore be an innovation throughout the en-
tirety of the complex regulatory regime of marriage, minimizing conflicts
among the levels of government. Moreover, the complexity of the regime
could permit experimentation at the various levels of government and with
respect to the specific benefit, obligation, or default rule in question. For
example, a state could initially provide individuals with the flexibility to
designate friends as eligible for certain benefits, obligations, or default rules
but not other benefits, obligations, or default rules.
Individuals can currently achieve some of this flexibility through private
contracting (for example through living-together agreements, prenuptial
agreements, or health care proxies), but not all of the consequences of mar-
riage can currently be assigned by contract (including, most importantly,
health insurance benefits, social security benefits, and rights under the
FMLA). Therefore, such a proposal would change the current substance of
the law to a great extent but not radically. The more radical aspect of this
type of proposal would be its rejection of private contracting to readjust the
current consequences of marriage determined by the state. Instead, some or
all of the benefits, obligations, and default rules currently reserved for
spouses would be available alike to spouses, friends, or the other individuals
designated. Such a proposal would therefore allow all individuals, not just
married couples, to decide how they would like the state to support their
personal relationships, if at all.' Unlike the current state of the law,
182. This approach is inspired in part by the Short Term Paid Leave plan proposed by Steve
Sugarman in the employment context. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Short Term Paid Leave: A New
Approach to Social Insurance and Employee Benefits, 75 CAL. L. REV. 465, 466-73 (1987). Like
that plan, the approach described above shifts control from the state to individuals, permitting indi-
viduals to decide how to use their benefits outside of state-approved categories. See id. at 470-71.
183. See Bernstein, supra note 142, at 146-52
184. Of course, specific implementations of this approach could also lead to various abuses
and perverse incentives. Future proposals for law reform would need to weigh the benefits of such
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marriage or a marriage-like relationship would not be a prerequisite for tak-
ing on the packages of benefits, obligations, and default rules provided by
federal, state and local governments. Instead, individuals could choose to
apply those packages to other types of personal relationships without engag-
ing in private contracting. In addition, individuals would not be required to
take or leave entire packages but rather could divide the packages among
multiple individuals, also without engaging in private contracting.
Such an approach could go a long way toward supporting the diverse
forms of care performed by multiple individuals in many people's lives and
encouraging other people to consider new ways to live their lives. State sup-
port would no longer hinge on the performance of types of domestic
caregiving rooted in a history of state-supported patriarchy. The care and
support provided and received outside of that framework would no longer be
ignored or negated. The boundaries of family law would be expanded, mak-
ing them much less likely to constrain individual preferences and practices.
Unlike other proposals, however, friendship would not be pushed to take on
the defining aspects of family in order to be let into family law's domain.
Rather, individuals could choose how they would like the state to support
and recognize both their friendships and family relationships.
In addition, such an approach would not necessitate a legal definition of
friendship or family, thereby acknowledging the potential fluidity of family
and friendship. Individual preference, rather than legal definition, would
control which relationships are supported by the state and which are not.
The only necessary limitation would seem to be one of mutuality: individu-
als could not unilaterally expect those in their proposed "caring network" to
either take on caregiving responsibilities or receive caregiving benefits.
Rather, some sort of acceptance would be required. Unlike current registra-
tion systems, however, individuals would not have to agree to a
comprehensive package of benefits and obligations. Moreover, different
people could play different roles in each other's lives. For example, an indi-
vidual could choose to use FMLA-type leave to care for a friend, but that
friend could later use her own leave to care for someone else.
an approach against those risks. This Article seeks first to imagine new approaches outside of the
existing constructions of marriage and friendship.
185. In this way, such an approach might avoid some of the dangers of categorization identi-
fied by queer theorists. See supra text accompanying notes 40-46, 163; see also Lauren Berlant &
Michael Warner, Sex in Public, in QUEER STUDIES: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY READER 170, 178
(Robert J. Corber & Stephen Valocchi eds., 2003) ("Queer social theory is committed to sexuality as
an inescapable category of analysis, agitation, and refunctioning."); Stacey Young, Dichotomies and
Displacement: Bisexuality in Queer Theory and Politics, in PLAYING WITm FIRE: QUEER POLITICS,
QUEER THEORIES 51, 61 (Shane Phelan ed., 1997) (emphasizing the need to "challenge both the
notion that identity categories represent epistemological certainties, and the notion that the uncer-
tainties that do exist are located primarily at what we think of as the boundaries that demarcate one
category from another"); cf Elsie Clews Parsons, Friendship, A Social Category, 21 AM. J. Soc.
230, 233 (1915) ("[F]riendship makes an implicit criticism of category as category.").
[Vol. 106:189
November 2007] Friends with Benefits 233
Potential constructions of family law like the one described above illus-
trate some of the ways that the state could begin to recognize personal
relationships without reinforcing existing hierarchies of care or producing
new ones. When guided by the principles of nonexclusivity and fluidity, new
constructions of family law can begin to blur the line between friends and
family, providing individuals with more freedom to structure their personal
lives in diverse ways. In the process, existing notions of both family and
friendship could be transformed. This transformation has particularly strong
implications for gender equality, as set forth below.
C. Transforming Gendered Relationships
Legal recognition of the diverse functions of friendship, including those
functions that resemble and overlap with the functions of family, could
transform the gendered nature of both family and friendship. First, as dis-
cussed above, recognition of friendship in addition to marriage could
alleviate some of the pressure placed on marriage and other domestic rela-
tionships to serve all caregiving functions. This repositioning of marriage
and domesticity could potentially promote gender equality by reducing the
amount of care expected to be provided within the home, care that is still
generally provided by women. Second, legal recognition of friendship
would also signal that friendships are an integral part of life, not merely a
break from domestic life or work. As discussed below, this repositioning of
friendship could lead to even more gender equality by changing the nature
of friendships between women, between men, and between women and
men. Women might receive more care in female friendships, men might re-
ceive more care in male friendships, and men and women might come to
experience opposite-sex friendships free from many of the constraints of
heteronormativity. In the process, the very nature of gender could be trans-
formed, freeing both women and men from many gender role constraints.
1. Relationships Between Women
Women have long been assumed to have close friendships with other
women. 86 Indeed, given the domestic care that women have traditionally
provided within the home, women are often thought to receive more emo-
tional care from their female friends than from their spouses and children.
87
186. For historical analyses of the strength of female friendships, see CHRISTINE JACOBSON
CARTER, SOUTHERN SINGLE BLESSEDNESS: UNMARRIED WOMEN IN THE URBAN SOUTH, 1800-
1865, at 95-117 (2006); Carroll Smith-Rosenberg, The Female World of Love and Ritual: Relations
between Women in Nineteenth-Century America, I SIGNS 1, 3-14 (1975).
187. This assumption is home out in some of the sociological literature. See, e.g., Kirsten Voss
et al., Friendship, Marriage and Self-Esteem, 16 J. Soc. & PERS. RELATIONSHIPS 103, 117 (1999)
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Female friendships create a space where women are thought to receive and
188provide care in more equal doses, instead of primarily providing care.
Friendship with other women can also provide the opportunity for women to
focus on the needs of women rather than the needs of men or children. 89
Friendships between women are therefore already assumed to be robust and
fulfilling.
Despite these positive views of female friendship, many women treat
friendship as secondary to their dating or domestic family lives., 90 This ap-
proach to friendship can be unconscious, as women are increasingly
overwhelmed by work and family responsibilities. 9 However, many women
consciously prioritize domestic family life-or potential domestic family
life in the case of dating-over friendship. 92 These choices are not surpris-
ing given that they are reinforced by various social forces that value family
over friendship, 93 including the current construction of family law.
194
Simultaneous legal recognition of family and friendship could begin to
disrupt these patterns, creating conditions under which women could more
explicitly contemplate why they might prioritize domestic family life, par-
ticularly married life, over friendship. As discussed earlier, 95 Adrienne Rich
(finding that wives reported being more comfortable "letting their guard down" when they were
with their best female friends than when they were with their husbands).
188. See BOWDEN, supra note 71, at 62 ("The revaluation of women's friendships and
women's lives becomes, then, the site of enquiry into the alternative ethical significance of chosen,
reciprocal relations.").
189. See, e.g., Pat O'Connor, Women's Friendships in a Post-Modern World, in PLACING
FRIENDSHIP IN CONTEXT 117, 132 (Rebecca G. Adams & Graham Allan eds., 1998) ("[Flriendships
between women, in so far as they affirm women's identity as women, are still in some ways poten-
tially at odds with a patriarchal culture."); JANICE G. RAYMOND, A PASSION FOR FRIENDS: TOWARD A
PHILOSOPHY OF FEMALE AFFECTION 205-241 (1986).
190. See, e.g., TERRI APTER & RUTHELLEN JOSSELSON, BEST FRIENDS: THE PLEASURES AND
PERILS OF GIRLS' AND WOMEN'S FRIENDSHIPS 251-59 (1998) (describing how female friendships
are the first thing to go when women become overly busy with work and family); STACEY J. OLIKER,
BEST FRIENDS AND MARRIAGE: EXCHANGE AMONG WOMEN 112-21 (1989) (describing how the
women in the author's studies consistently placed family first, although they reported more close-
ness with their female friends than with their husbands).
191. See, e.g., HOCHSCHILD WITH MACHUNG, supra note 117, at 149-66 (describing the in-
creasingly common situation where wives earn as much as their husbands in the workplace yet also
do most of the housework and childcare coordination); Amy L. Wax, Bargaining in the Shadow of
the Market: Is There a Future for Egalitarian Marriage?, 84 VA. L. REV. 509, 519-24 (1998).
192. See, e.g., OLIKER, supra note 190, at 113-14, 117-18.
193. See, e.g., PAT O'CONNOR, FRIENDSHIPS BETWEEN WOMEN 102 (1992) (discussing the
possibility that the "cultural primacy attached to coupleness means that friendships between single
women, whether individual or group-based, and regardless of their provisions, will never be seen as
satisfactory").
194. See supra text accompanying notes 50-52, 121-126 (discussing family law scholars'
presumption that women will ultimately marry or otherwise engage in caregiving that takes place
within the home).
195. See supra text accompanying notes 108-111.
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called on women to engage in such contemplation over twenty-five years
ago. Her goal was to challenge compulsory heterosexuality by creating op-
portunities for women to question why they have embraced marriage with
men over relationships with other women. Legal recognition of friendship
could serve a similar function by presenting women with a socially recog-
nized way of living outside of marriage or domesticity. 196 Some women who
are not currently living a lesbian life might gain sufficient strength from
such legal recognition to prioritize relationships with women-whether the
relationships be sexual or friendly in nature, or both-over interactions with
men.
Other women might still continue to interact with men, as lovers or
friends, or both, but legal recognition of friendship could create additional
opportunities for these women to live outside marriage. Rachel Moran has
criticized feminists for assuming that all women live within marriage, or at
least want to, instead of acknowledging that many women are single and
cherish the "emotional individualism" created by living outside marriage.'
97
This critique is important, as feminists' focus -on family care work can es-
sentialize women as caregivers, obscuring the constructed nature of
women's caregiving roles and ignoring the women who have chosen to re-
ject those roles. But women need not make a choice between marriage and
solitude.' gs Rather, women can live outside marriage while enjoying the
connection, care, and support of friendship.' 99 Such connection can be
achieved with both male and female friends, but given current gender
norms, women might feel more inclined to discuss with other women why
196. Cf O'Connor, supra note 189, at 132 (describing female friendship as "undermin[ing]
the idea that women's only source of identity and pleasure lies in a relationship with a man").
197. Moran, supra note 32, at 228; see also supra text accompanying notes 119-120 (elabo-
rating Moran's critique).
198. The term "emotional individualism" could be read as implying such a choice, but indi-
vidualism can mean many things beyond solitude. Indeed, at no point does Moran describe such
individualism as similar to isolationism. Thus, Moran's critique appears to be similar to mine, in that
she advocates individual freedom to structure life outside of marriage. However, Moran does not
explicitly discuss the ways that women could engage in relationships outside of marriage. That
silence, combined with Moran's focus on "single women," could lead readers to interpret "emo-
tional individualism" more narrowly than Moran intended.
199. Single women have created similar social networks in the past, as evidenced by the lit-
erature about "single blessedness" during the nineteenth century. See, e.g., CARTER, supra note 186;
LEE VIRGINIA CHAMBERS-SCHILLER, LIBERTY, A BETTER HUSBAND: SINGLE WOMEN IN AMERICA:
THE GENERATIONS OF 1780-1840 (1984); Ruth Freeman & Patricia Klaus, Blessed or Not? The
New Spinster in England and the United States in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centu-
ries, 9 J. FAM. HIsT. 394 (1984). Moran discusses this literature, but she implies that individualism
constituted, or should constitute, the core of such single existence. Moran, supra note 32, at 228,
251-56. 1 propose instead that women might cherish their single status in part because of the rich
social network that it permits.
200. For a discussion of how legal recognition of friendship might change such norms, see
infra text accompanying notes 213-224.
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they are prioritizing friendship over marriage, and they may receive more
support as a result of that sharing. Legal recognition of friendship would
reinforce that being unmarried does not have to mean being alone. Instead,
the law would acknowledge that women can live robust personal lives apart
from traditional notions of marriage and domesticity.
Finally, legal recognition of friendship could facilitate women's simulta-
neous embrace of both marriage and friendship.2°' Legal recognition of both
marriage and friendship would signal that marriage need not involve the
sacrifice of a woman's other relationships once she becomes a wife. This in
turn could encourage married women to rethink the role of both marriage
and friendship in their lives. For example, some women could feel empow-
ered to reallocate caregiving responsibilities to their spouses in order to free
up more time for friendship. In the process, both marriage and friendship
might be transformed.
2. Relationships Between Men
Traditionally, friendships among men constituted the most revered form
22 203
of social interaction. Philosophers such as Aristotle °2 and Montaigne pos-
ited friendship as the ultimate human relationship, emphasizing that it could
be achieved only between men. 204 Well into the nineteenth century, men con-
tinued to rely on one another for intellectual stimulation, moral guidance,
205
and emotional support.
This history has led one legal scholar to voice concern that legal recog-
nition of friendship could reinforce patriarchy by furthering the power of
206
male networks such as fraternities and business associations. Beyond
201. Scholars in the past have illustrated how female friendships have helped sustain marriage
by providing an emotional closeness that was absent from many patriarchal marriages. See, e.g.,
OLIKER, supra note 190, at 38; Smith-Rosenberg, supra note 186, at 22-24. Here, in contrast, I
envision both friendship and marriage providing women with fulfillment and support.
202. ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 192-97 (David Ross trans., 1980).
203. MONTAIGNE, Of friendship, in THE COMPLETE ESSAYS OF MONTAIGNE 135 (Donald M.
Frame ed., 1948).
204. See also Karen Walker, Men, Women, and Friendship: What They Say, What They Do, 8
GENDER & Soc'Y 246, 261 (1994) ("Earlier ideologies of friendship represented women as incapa-
ble of loyalty and true friendship and men as noble friends."). For an analysis of how Mill broke
with this tradition and advocated friendship within marriage, see Mary Lyndon Shanley, Marital
Slavery and Friendship: John Stuart Mill's The Subjection of Women, in FEMINIST INTERPRETA-
TIONS AND POLITICAL THEORY 164 (Mary Lyndon Shanley & Carole Pateman eds., 1991).
205. See, e.g., DAVID HERBERT DONALD, "WE ARE LINCOLN MEN": ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND
His FRIENDS (2003); see also GRAHAM ALLAN, FRIENDSHIP 65 (1989) ("Nearly all the great friend-
ships from literature and history discussed in more philosophically oriented analyses are friendships
between men.").
206. See Leib, supra note 58, at 667-69. For a similar discussion from a nonlegal perspective,
see O'Connor, supra note 189, at 123-25.
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denying the power of female friendships, this concern reveals just how im-
poverished notions of male friendship have become. Friendships between
men are presumed to be motivated by the accumulation of power in the
realms of work and civic engagement as opposed to the sharing of confi-
dences and provision of emotional support in all aspects of life.
20 7
This limited view of male friendship could be motivated, in part, by
family law's role in the division between marriage and friendship. Under the
current construction of family law, marriage and marriage-like relationships
are assumed to fulfill all private caregiving needs. Moreover, given gendered
patterns of care, straight men might receive more care within these relation-
ships than straight women do. These factors could intersect to shape men's
views of friendship in multiple ways.
For example, married men could view friendship outside of business or
civic associations as unnecessary given the care they receive within mar-
riage.208 Alternatively, because of the care they receive within marriage,
married men could view emotional friendships with other men as disloyal to
their partners.0 9 Similarly, because of the connection between care and the
sexual relationship of marriage, straight men could view robust friendships
with other men as potentially impugning their sexual orientation or mascu-
linity.210 Or single men of all sexual orientations could interpret the law's
207. This presumption is borne out in various social science literature. See, e.g., ALLAN,
supra note 205, at 71 ("Men... are likely to be involved in a set of relationships whose basis is
sociability and enjoyment, often arranged around specific tasks and activities. However, the major-
ity, though not all, of these relationships are likely to be relatively shallow in terms of the degree to
which personal worries, anxieties and other matters of consequence to the self are discussed.");
LARRY MAY, MASCULINITY & MORALITY 130 (1998) ("Male friendships with other men, at least in
Western societies, tend to be based on shared activities, such as sports events, rather than shared
stories of life experiences. As a result, it is quite common for men to say that they really don't know
the other men in their lives, even their best friends."); RUBIN, supra note 56, at 61 ("Generally,
women's friendships with each other rest on shared intimacies, self-revelation, nurturance and emo-
tional support .... In contrast, men's relationships are marked by shared activities." (footnotes
omitted)); Walker, supra note 204, at 246 ("[T]he notions that women share intimate feelings
whereas men share activities in their friendships are more accurately viewed as cultural ideologies
than as observable gender differences in behavior.").
208. See ALLAN, supra note 205, at 73 ("[I]t could be argued that men are more likely to meet
whatever needs they have for intimacy within their families, rather than with their friends and
peers.... To the extent that men do use their relationships with their wives to express their more
personal feelings, anxieties, and worries ... they are simply endorsing traditional marital roles.").
209. Of course, this concern about disloyalty could also extend to friendships between men
and women. See infra text accompanying notes 213-223.
210. For examples of this fear, see RUBIN, supra note 56, at 103-05 (discussing how some
straight men respond to the potential homoeroticism of male friendship); Barbara J. Bank &
Suzanne L. Hansford, Gender &friendship: Why are men's best same-sex friendships less intimate
and supportive?, 7 PERS. RELATIONSHIPS 63, 65 (2000) (concluding that homophobia partially ex-
plains why most male friendships are less intimate and supportive than female friendships); Jennifer
8. Lee, The Man Date: What do you call two straight men having dinner?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10,
2005, § 9, at I ("Anyone who finds a date with a potential romantic partner to be a minefield of
unspoken rules should consider the man date, a rendezvous between two straight men that is even
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recognition of marriage and silence about friendship as creating a choice




Simultaneous legal recognition of family and friendship could begin to
transform these limited views of male friendship. Such recognition would
signal that friendship can be a site of care and support in addition to mar-
riage or marriage-like relationships instead of a threat to or an inadequate
substitute for such relationships. Men might be more willing to expand their
notions of male friendship beyond accumulations of power or simple recrea-
tion in order to include emotional connections with other men. In addition,
legal recognition of friendship would signal that such emotional connection
need not always be attached to sex, potentially reducing the frequency with
which male friendship is thought to suggest sexual connection. Such signal-
ing could create more possibility that nonsexual male friendships would be
acknowledged and accepted as such.2'2 That acknowledgment could lead to
more diverse and fulfilling male friendships, as well as reduce some of the
pressure currently placed on sexual relationships to serve all caregiving
functions. Men could ultimately give and receive more care from each other,
disrupting gendered patterns of care and alleviating the inequality that can
flow from such patterns.
3. Relationships Between Women and Men
Family law's recognition of friendship could also create more opportuni-
ties for diverse friendships between women and men. Such friendships are
currently limited by the suggestion that the relationship is simply a preview
for coupling or is motivated by at least one of the parties' desire to have
sex. 213 As discussed above in Part II, this suggestion is furthered, in part, by
more socially perilous."); Matt's Action Off-Screen, Us WEEKLY, Aug. 13, 2007, at 82 (interviewing
the actor Matt Damon, who refers to his male friend Ben Affleck as "my hetero lifemate"). This fear
could also explain why some men value their cross-gender friendships more than their male friend-
ships. See, e.g., William M. Bukowski et al., A Test of Aristotle's Model of Friendship for Young
Adults' Same-Sex and Opposite-Sex Relationships, 127 J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 595, 595-603 (1987);
Sandra Parker & Brian de Vries, Patterns of Friendship for Women and Men in Same and Cross-sex
Relationships, 10 J. Soc. & PERS. RELATIONSHIPS. 617, 623 (1993); John M. Reisman, Intimacy in
Same-Sex Friendships, 23 SEx ROLES 65, 80 (1990).
211. In this way, friendships between men could be limited in much the same way that friend-
ships between women are limited when women prioritize marriage or dating over friendship. See
supra text accompanying notes 190-194.
212. Of course, such friendships already exist, including between gay and straight men, but
they are often considered suspect or otherwise constrained by homophobia. See. e.g., JAMMIE PRICE,
NAVIGATING DIFFERENCES: FRIENDSHIPS BETWEEN GAY AND STRAIGHT MEN 5 (1999).
213. See, e.g., ALLAN, supra note 205, at 82 ("Because of the intrusion of aspects of sexual-
ity ... cross-gender friendships tend be rather different from same-gender ones."); RUBIN, supra
note 56, at 149 ("[Wlhen I asked about their friendships with the opposite sex, most people's
thoughts turned quickly to the ways in which sex, whether acted on or not, both gives the relation-
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family law's recognition of marriage as the ultimate relationship and its cor-
responding silence about friendship. That construction positions all
opposite-sex friendships as mere vehicles designed to achieve the friendship
of marriage. These dynamics are particularly present in friendships between
straight women and men, but the dynamics can influence other opposite-sex
friendships as well.
For example, straight women who develop friendships with gay men are
often assumed to hold out hope of converting the men, or they are assumed
to gravitate toward such friendships because they are afraid of, or unable to
maintain, dating relationships with straight men.2 4 Gay men in such rela-
tionships are not similarly assumed to want to convert their friends, but the
specter of straight marriage still looms: the men in these relationships are
often assumed to crave womanly influence and the type of care that only a
women is expected to provide."' There are generally not similar myths
about friendship between lesbians and straight men, at least not outside of
the pornography-based fantasy that women who claim to be lesbians just
need to find the right straight man.' 6 Instead, friendships between lesbians
and straight men are presumed not to exist, 2 " reflecting once again the
power of straight marriage: straight men are assumed to have no interest in
women if dating potential is absent, and lesbians are assumed to be lesbians
because of their dislike of straight men.
ship a special charge and also creates difficulties that are not easily overcome."); R. Lance Shotland
& Jane M. Craig, Can Men and Women Differentiate between Friendly and Sexually Interested
Behavior?, 51 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 66, 71 (1988) ("Men perceive more situations as sexually oriented
than do women."). Sociological research reveals, however, that in reality men and women can have
nonsexual friendships with one another. See Heidi M. Reeder, "I like you.., as a friend": The role
of attraction in cross-sex friendship, 17 J. Soc. & PERS. RELATIONSHIPS 329, 344-46 (2000).
214. Such assumptions can be shared by members of both straight and gay communities. See,
e.g., Dawne Moon, Insult and Inclusion: The Term Fag Hag and Gay Male "Community ", 74 Soc.
FORCES 487, 491-92, 494-95 (1995). Despite these assumptions, sociological studies reveal that
straight women and gay men value their friendships with one another and even anticipate growing
old together. E.g., Anna Muraco, Intentional Families: Fictive Kin ies Between Cross-Gender,
Different Sexual Orientation Friends, 68 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1313, 1318-19 (2006). However, in
one study gay men expressed anxiety that plans for the future will change after their straight female
friends marry. Id. at 1319-20, 1322.
215. Cf RUBIN, supra note 56, at 173 ("For gay men and straight women ... the alliance
seems a natural one, their friendships bringing a kind of comfort and companionship that neither can
find easily in the world of heterosexual men where both have been devalued so consistently and for
so long."). In addition, gay men report that they view their straight female friends "as potentially
providing access to a family life that involves children." Muraco, supra note 214, at 1319.
216. This fantasy positions lesbians as always ready for a threesome with a willing straight
man, particularly the pornography viewer. See, e.g., LINDA WILLIAMS, HARD CORE: POWER, PLEAS-
URE AND THE "FRENZY OF THE VISIBLE," 127, 139-40 (1989).
217. See, e.g., RUBIN, supra note 56, at 170-71 (discussing the "paucity of lesbian/straight
men friendships"). This presumption is not borne out in reality, however. Muraco, supra note 214, at
1318-19 (discussing several friendships between lesbians and straight men).
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Of particular interest to the analysis here is the assumption that lesbians
and gay men can have friendships with each other that are entirely devoid of
these dynamics. But that assumption is too influenced by family law's focus
on marriage to the exclusion of friendship: friendship can be embraced as
friendship in this context because marriage or marriage-like relationships
are seen as impossible."' In all other male-female interactions, heterosexual
sex or marriage are viewed as possibilities, however remote, thereby color-
ing the friendships that develop between men and women who are not
married to one another.
Simultaneous legal recognition of family and friendship would not com-
pletely eliminate the suspicion that friendships between men and women are
motivated by sexual desire. However, legal recognition could alter the view
that such friendships are simply poor substitutes for marriage and marriage-
like relationships. By recognizing both marriage and friendship, family law
would signal that marriage need not be the only site for emotional care and
support. Rather, friendships could also serve similar functions and need not
be seen as in direct competition with marriage.
This recognition of friendship could ultimately create more opportuni-
ties for diverse friendships between women and men by reducing the
perceived threat of friendship to marriage. Given the exclusivity and com-
prehensiveness of current notions of marriage, spouses often resist the
attempts of their partners to develop or sustain friendships outside of the
marital relationship. Such resistance might be motivated by a desire to main-
tain emotional exclusivity, a desire that can affect same-sex and opposite-
sex friendships alike.' 9 But the resistance might also be motivated by a de-
sire to maintain sexual exclusivity, which most affects the opposite-sex
friendships that straight spouses seek to have with individuals other than
their cospouse. 220 The existence of such resistance can be tied, in part, to
218. Although, of course, the marriage laws in every state would permit such marriages be-
cause they would be opposite sex. In the straight imagination, however, marriage is still tied to
romantic passion and conjugality, rendering marriage in this context a cultural impossibility. Cf
BUTLER, supra note 41, at 141 (discussing "what happens when a gay male and a lesbian who are
friends start to sleep with one another").
219. However, concerns about "emotional infidelity" are often most intense when the extra-
marital emotional connection is forged with a potential sexual partner. See, e.g., Emily B. Russell &
Helen C. Harton, The "Other Factors": Using Individual and Relationship Characteristics to Pre-
dict Sexual and Emotional Jealousy, 24 CURRENT PSYCHOL. 242, 248-49 (2005); Virgil L. Sheets &
Marlow D. Wolfe, Sexual Jealousy in Heterosexuals, Lesbians, and Gays, 44 SEX ROLEs 255, 256
(2001). Therefore, the desire for emotional exclusivity is likely intertwined with the desire for sex-
ual exclusivity. See infra text accompanying note 220.
220. For examples of the perceived threat of such friendships, see BRENDA COSSMAN, SEXUAL
CITIZENS: THE LEGAL AND CULTURAL REGULATION OF SEX AND BELONGING (forthcoming 2007);
Shirlan A. Williams, Jealousy in the Cross-Sex Friendship, 10 J. Loss & TRAUMA 471, 473-78
(2005). I use the term spouse here for ease of reference, but the same dynamics apply to the parties
in unmarried opposite-sex relationships who seek to develop or sustain friendships with members of
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family law's role in creating the division between marriage and friendship
and then attaching benefits and obligations only to marriage (or, in some
states, marriage-like relationships). As discussed earlier, because the state
has traditionally denied lesbians and gay men access to marriage, sexual
couplings and friendships in gay communities have often been more fluid
and shifting than those in straight communities."' This fluidity does not
eliminate the resistance described above, 2 but it does change its nature by
creating more opportunities for couples to discuss what may be motivating
their desires for emotional and sexual exclusivity.
Simultaneous legal recognition of family and friendship would similarly
not eliminate all desires for exclusivity, but it could change the dynamics
that currently envelop many opposite-sex marriages and couplings. By ex-
plicitly recognizing friendship, family law would signal that marriage is not
the sole vehicle for sustaining personal relationships between adults. Mar-
riage would thus no longer need to be viewed as a comprehensive or
exclusive relationship. Instead, marriage could be viewed more like child-
rearing: parents can raise many children without anyone thinking their
relationship with one of those children is unimportant. This perspective on
marriage could provide couples with more freedom to discuss how their
emotional, or even sexual, needs could be satisfied both within their rela-
tionship and without, creating more potential for diverse and robust
opposite-sex friendships outside of coupling.
These changing dynamics between men and women could ultimately
lead to a time when friendships between men and women are not viewed
the opposite sex outside of the romantic relationship. The term spouse, or its unmarried equivalent,
also obscures gender differences in the ways spouses perceive potential infidelities. Sociological
studies reveal that heterosexual men are more likely than heterosexual women to be concerned about
sexual infidelity, whereas heterosexual women (and lesbians and gay men) are more concerned
about emotional infidelity. E.g., Sheets & Wolfe, supra note 219, at 270.
221. See supra text accompanying notes 73-76.
222. See, e.g., Sheets & Wolfe, supra note 219, at 270.
223. See, e.g., Elizabeth F Emens, Monagamy's Law: Compulsory Monogamy and Polyamor-
ous Existence, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 277, 354-61 (2004) (exploring the legal and
social presumption of monogamy and proposing legal recognition of alternatives to monogamy,
relying in part on analogies to the non-exclusivity of friendship). Of course, some, if not most, mar-
ried couples may decide to remain monogamous, and that decision can lead to sexual jealousy from
time to time. Because the decision would be a decision, however, instead of an assumption or a
matter of course, couples would likely be in a better position to discuss issues of jealousy as they
arise. See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Emens, Just Monogamy?, in JUST MARRIAGE 75, 79 (Mary Lyndon
Shanley ed., 2004) ("[Polyamorists] tend to think that jealousy can and should be overcome by open
honest communication and self-interrogation about the source of the jealousy."). Legal recognition
of friendship could therefore lead to more diverse conceptions of both friendship and marriage be-
tween women and men.
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as fundamentally different from same-sex friendships. 4 Rather, opposite-
sex friendships could come to be viewed as performing the same diverse
range of functions performed by same-sex friendships. The needs of men
and women would no longer be viewed as radically different, intelligible
to the other sex only in the bedroom. Instead, women could form close
relationships with both women and men, even in the absence of sex, and
men similarly could form close relationships with both men and women.
Gender would no longer be a dispositive component of friendship. Greater
opportunities for gender equality would likely result, as neither women nor
men would be constrained by narrow gender role expectations. Family law's
recognition of friendship could therefore transform not just friendship and
marriage, but gender itself.
CONCLUSION
Constructions of family law have long shaped notions of both family
and friendship, often to the disadvantage of women. By explicitly placing
friendship within the law, family law scholars can begin to more fully exam-
ine the ways that facially neutral constructions of family law contribute to
gender inequality. The law of marriage was originally designed to privatize
women's dependency. Current constructions of family may generate that
dependency instead of reflecting it. By focusing on the construction of fam-
ily law instead of the construction of family, family law scholars can dissect
domestic dependency, exposing its constructed nature. In the process, the
diverse roles of friendship in people's lives can be acknowledged, supported,
and even encouraged. Women and men may then experience more freedom
to structure their lives, both in families and in the world at large.
224. Indeed, the subsections of this section could become irrelevant or even unintelligible. At
present, however, sociological studies reveal that friendships are still greatly shaped by gender norms.
Muraco, supra note 214, at 1321; see also text accompanying notes 186-218.
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